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PREFACE 
It is with considerable pleasure that the Institute of Urban 
Studies releases this report. The Institute has long been involved 
in what we term 11 action research 11 -- research that, we trust, proposes 
realistic solutions to urban problems. This report falls squarely in 
this tradition and it is to be hoped that it will reach a wide audience 
in Winnipeg and in other communities that face similar problems. 
This report was prepared by a well-known urban specialist. Follow-
ing a distinguished career as a civil servant, consultant, and professor, 
Mr. Earl Levin spent six months at the Institute as a Senior Fellow under 
a program financially supported by the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation. This fellowship program will be continued in the coming 
years and future 11 fellows 11 will have high standards to follow. 
Alan F.J. Artibise 
Director 
February, 1985 
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l. 0 BACKGROUND 
l.l Origin of the Idea 
The revitalization of Winnipeg•s core area has long been a matter 
of concern for the city•s government, the city•s downtown businessmen, 
and the general public, at least for that part of the general public 
which believes that a healthy and attractive central area is essential 
to the health and attractiveness of the city as a whole. Perhaps the 
first formally expressed and statistically documented concern for the 
well-being of the city•s downtown is contained in the plan for Downtown 
Winnipeg which was published by the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater 
Winnipeg in 1970, nearly 15 years ago. That plan proposed the develop-
ment of a significant residential component as an essential element of 
downtown revitalization. Following closely upon the publication of that 
document, a number of apartment buildings were constructed in the area 
south of Portage Avenue by both private sector and public sector developers 
for the economic rental market and for senior citizens respectively. 
Two private sector apartment blocks were also built in the area north of 
Portage Avenue, on the edge of Central Park, during this period. Since 
that time, however, there has been little new housing built in downtown 
Winnipeg. Since that time as well, concerns about the vitality of the 
central area have continued to deepen, as evidence of further deteriora-
tion has continued to mount; and complaints and demands that something be 
done to arrest the decline have continued to be voiced, especially with 
respect to the area on the north side of Portage Avenue. 
It is partly as a result of these expressions of dismay and demands 
for remedial action that the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was put in place, 
and in particular, that the North Portage project was undertaken. The 
components of this project which have been identified by the North Portage 
Development Corporation (the project Authority) for incorporation in this 
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ambitious redevelopment scheme include a variety of items, but the largest 
single and perhaps most significant item is a residential component of 
over 1000 units. Presently it is not clear how the Corporation intends 
to proceed with the implementation of the scheme. However, in all likeli-
hood, the Corporation will follow the traditional process of calling for 
proposals. 
What is quite clear, however, is that there is now a widespread 
conviction that a significant amount of housing must form an essential 
element of any program of central area revitalization. This conviction 
was expressed in the Metropolitan Government•s Downtown Winnipeg Plan 
of 1970, and has been reiterated time and again through the intervening 
years, until it currently finds expression in the recommendations for 
the redevelopment project for North Portage. Perhaps even more interest-
ing than these public-body statements is the fact that now an important 
segment of the private sector has also come to this conclusion. 
In their submission to the North of Pbrtage Administrative Task 
Force in June 1983, the Winnipeg Developer•s Consortium comprising five 
major development companies (Lakeview Development Ltd; Metropolitan 
Properties Corpn; Qualico Developments Ltd; Shelter Corpn. of Canada; 
the Imperial Group) in the city, proposed that the North of Portage site, 
bounded by Portage Avenue, Colony Street, Ellice Avenue and Edmonton 
Street, be redeveloped for a variety of uses, but with a residential 
community of about 1000 housing units as the major component of the 
scheme. 
In a subsequent submission to the Executive Policy Committee of the 
City, on August 24, 1983, the Consortium stated: 
The Creation of a distinctive and cohesive residential 
community as represented by Northside Village in our 
proposal, is, we believe, the first necessary step in 
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transforming Winnipeg's declining core area into an 
attractive and vital sector of the city. That 
transformation will involve a change in the character 
of the downtown from the specialized, limited, retail 
and office centre for the metropolitan area which it 
was in the past, but no longer is, to a fully rounded 
multiple activity sector where people not only work and 
find their recreation and entertainment, but where many, 
many people also have their homes. It is however, 
only a first step. It must be followed by other steps. 
We are confident that if this first step can be 
accomplished properly, it will act as a demonstration 
of the fact th~t it can be done, and other residential 
development will follow. But this potential for 
stimulating further development will soon be lost if 
the public sector does not recognize the critical role 
which housing must play in the redevelopment of the 
centre of the city, and actively build upon the slim 
advantage provided by the success of Northside Village. 
We see the necessity of a public commitment to the prin-
ciple that housing must be the primary instrument of 
core area redevelopment, and that a systematic plan of 
creating "Northside Villages" in selected enclaves of 
the central area must be pursued .... l 
At a conference entitled "Beyond the Core Area Initiative" held at 
the University of Winnipeg on March l, 1984, the author presented a 
paper which pointed out that Winnipeg has been in a slow-growth condition 
for several decades, and this is the basic reason why there has been so 
little new investment and development in the city generally, and in the 
downtown in particular. The paper went on to say: 
l 
... in a situation of slow growth there is little develop-, 
ment initiated by the private sector. The development 
initiative must therefore swing to the public sector, 
because jobs, revenues, business and other basic economic 
matters and political interests are at stake .... 
Winnipeg Developers Consortium- Submission to Executive Policy 
Committee, City of Winnipeg, August 24, 1983. 
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... the traditional positions occupied by the public 
sector and the private sector respectively are 
essentially positions of confrontation, or adversary 
positions .... 
... However where there is little development activity 
these traditional attitudes and roles produce no 
advantage to anyone. The private developer simply 
moves his capital and his expertise to locations 
where opportunity is more plentiful and climate less 
hostile; and the slow growth city suffers the 
consequences .... 
... What is required is a much more direct and closer 
relationship between the public sector and the private 
sector in the planning, financing, and carrying out 
of selected critical development projects. The 
appropriate instrument might be a permanent joint 
public-private development corporation, at arms length 
from government, whose role would be not only to 
plan and carry out but also to provide a flow of 
investment capital on a joint equity basis, for the 
development of selected key projects which the private 
sector alone would not be interested in undertaking 
in a slow-growth situation .... 2 
At the same conference, representatives of the Downtown Winnipeg 
Association, and The Imperial Group expressed strong agreement with the 
views set out in that paper. Each of them stated that significant 
private sector investment in core area housing cannot be expected at 
the present time or in the foreseeable future. Economic conditions 
are simply too unfavourable to attract investment in rental housing 
anywhere. This economic disincentive is aggravated in the core area 
by the general unattractiveness of that part of the city, putting 
private investments in double jeopardy in that location. They said, 
2 Levin, Earl - Beyond The Core Area Initiative: Prospects For Down-
town Winnipeg, March 24, 1983. Subsequently published as Occasional 
Paper #4 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1984. 
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however, that if a new kind of public sector-private sector arrangement 
could be created under which the private developer could have a reason-
able expectation of return on his investment, some private developers 
would be willing to undertake a core area housing project, probably as 
a one-time-only deal, in a spirit of public service and even of adven-
ture, and as a change from the normal routine undertakings which comprise 
their standard investment and development portfolios. It seems clear 
that a large body of informed opinion now holds that housing must be 
an essential element in any plan for the revitalization of Winnipeg's 
core area. It is also clear that there has been very little housing 
built in the central area of the city for the last decade and more, 
certainly not enough to act as a stimulant to core area renewal. This 
part of the city simply has not been able to attract residential develop-
ment capital; and in the light of the views expressed by the representa-
tives of the private sector at the conference ctted above, the area is 
likely to continue to be unattractive to private sector investment under 
the conditions which now prevail. Nor is the public sector in any 
position under present circumstances, to take any effective initiative 
in developing economic market housing. But, as has been pointed out, 
housing on a substantial scale is a critical ingredient of core area 
revitalization. It would appear, therefore, that the prospect for that 
revitalization is very dim. 
It has been suggested, however, that there is some hope of attracting 
the interest of the private developer, and of enlisting the commitment 
of the public sector, if some new public sector-private sector relation-
ship could be created in which the private investor could have some 
assurance of the security of his investment and of a reasonable return, 
and the public sector could have some assurance, on an acceptable 
financial basis, of a significant volume of housing and the stimulation 
of new vitality in the declining sectors of the core area. 
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One fact has become very clear in the field of housing during the 
last decade or so - economic rental housing cannot be provided by the 
private sector without substantial subsidies. Mortgage interest rates 
and construction costs are too high to be supported by average market 
rental rates. This fact has been recognized by government, and there 
has been a steady progression of programs designed to stimulate the 
production of rental housing which the market can support through vari-
ous forms of subsidy ranging from tax shelters such as the MURB program 
to long-term favourable loans such as the CRSP, 3 to interest write-downs 
such as Manitoba 1 s Rental Start Program. 4 And there have been numerous 
others by the federal government, as well as by the various provincial 
governments which need not be enumerated here. All of these have been 
necessary to achieve the desired production of housing, and have in 
fact, been fairly successful in that regard. 
However, they are unsatisfactory in a number of important respects. 
They are ad hoc programs with no assurance of continuity beyond the 
current period of commitment which is invariably short-term; they are 
programs introduced by different levels of government, and there is no 
assurance that the subventions they provide will all be simultaneously 
available to any specific project so that they can be combined into a 
single effective sum; they are administered by different agencies and 
3 
4 
Canada Rental Supply Plan. Under this plan federal government loans 
are available to developers of rental housing on the basis of an 
ascribed value of the land per rental unit. These loans are interest-
free for 15 years, and no repayment is required during that 15 years 
period. In year 16 repayment begins at the interest rate prevailing 
at that time and on the basis of the remaining amortization period. 
The Rental Start Program of the Province of Manitoba provides 
mortgages at 3% below the prime rate for a period of seven years after 
which the scheme is converted to conventional mortgage financing at 
the then prevailing interest rate. 
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frequently the amount available under each is variable and dependent upon 
the judgement of the officials administering the respective programs 
without regard for the evaluation of the officials administering the 
program of another government; and they are designed for the general 
housing market, whether national or provincial, and do not lend themselves 
readily to concentration in a particular area to achieve a special purpose 
such as the revitalization of the core area of Winnipeg. 
Clearly if a new scheme for the production of housing in Winnipeg's 
core area is to be feasible, it must provide a substantial amount of 
government funds on a basis which avoids the shortcomings referred to 
previously. The funding must be substantial enough and the terms on 
which those government funds are provided must be favourable enough to 
ensure the economic feasibility of the housing program; the funds must 
be committed over a sufficiently long time period to ensure the achieve-
ment of the program's target number of dwellings; and it must be 
possible to direct those funds to selected and limited areas for the 
purpose of achieving special, localized, development objectives. The 
funding, however, need not take the form of an outright grant or a write-
off. It could take the form of a long-term loan, to be repaid without 
interest which would enable the housing project or projects to overcome 
the great problems of early cash flow and heavy debt servicing costs. 
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1.2 Shortcomings of Present Financial System 
An illustration of the way in which the present system works 
against the development of housing in the core area is provided by 
the events relating to the call for proposals issued by the Core 
Area Initiative for a housing project on the half-block on the east 
side of Edmonton Street between Ellice Avenue and Qu'Appelle Avenue 
in November of 1983. 
The site was acquired in September 1981 as part of the expropria-
tion of properties by the CAI which was addressed in its mandate. 
The Notice of Intent did not specify the purpose of the expropriation, 
other than the usual legal "public purposes" phraseology, nor was 
there a clear, specific, intended use for the property in the mind 
of the authorities. The programs which the Core Area Initiative was 
authoriled to pursue were stated in broad general terms, and the 
authorities proceeded with confidence that the land was required for 
their general purposes, and that a specific purpose would clearly 
emerge in due course as the programs evolved. However, there seems to 
have been some failure of communication among the parties to the 
Initiative as to the prospective use of the property, because two 
years later serious differences surfaced which have not yet been resolved, 
and which have gravely jeopardized, if not in fact, destroyed the 
possibility of developing housing on the site. 
In November 1983, the Core Area Initiative office issued a call for 
proposals for the development of housing on this half-block of property, 
to which there were five responses from developers. Three of these 
responses proposed projects for the subject property and two were for 
sites in the general area but not for the Edmonton Street site. The Core 
Area Initiative office short-listed the three proposals for the subject 
property and was about to enter into the final selection process when the 
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Mayor of the City of Winnipeg pointed out that it was his understanding 
that this particular half-block of property was intended for development 
as a park. In support of his contention, he referred to the Downtown 
Winnipeg plan which had been prepared by the Metropolitan government of 
Winnipeg in 1970. In that plan, not just the half-block between Edmonton 
Street and the lane east of Edmonton Street had been designated as a park, 
but the entire block between Edmonton Street and Carlton Street, Ellice 
Avenue and Qu 1 Appelle had been so designated - as an extension of Central 
Park. 
The 1970 Downtown Winnipeg plan, however, had proposed the extension 
of Central Park southward on the full-block width from Qu 1Appelle to 
Ellice Avenue not simply as an extension of the park itself to Ellice, 
but as part of a corridor containing various recreational and amenity 
uses which would span across Portage Avenue and continue southward to 
connect with a convention centre and aquarium which the plan proposed 
as the southerly anchor of that public amenity corridor. The only 
component of that concept which has been realized in the fourteen years 
since the Downtown Winnipeg plan was produced, is the convention centre 
and there is not the slightest possibility of the full corridor extend-
ing to Central Park ever being built. The Mayor 1 S contention that the 
Edmonton Street property, acquired in 1981 by the Core Area Initiative, 
was intended to be developed as a park is simply a vestigial remnant 
of that 1970 plan. Nevertheless the Mayor questioned the propr1iety of 
changing the proposed use from the park which 1had been indicated on 
that plan to housing for which the Core Area Initiative had issued a 
proposal call, and he moved to suspend the action on the housing proposal. 
The City 1 S Environment Committee agreed with the Mayor and unanimously 
adopted a resolution that the property be developed as a park. Residents 
of the Central Park area who were interviewed on the matter were divided 
in their views. Generally it was felt that more park and park improvements 
were needed before more housing. However, among those over 65 years of age, 
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more housing was viewed as a priority over parks. 
The three short-listed proposals were all heavily dependent on public 
subsidies for their financing. One of these submissions, for which more 
detailed information than for the other two proposals was made available 
to this study, p·r'oposed the construction of 144 dwelling units on the site, 
comprising a mixture of studio, one-bedroom, and two-bedroom apartments, 
with underground parking, shops, recreation facilities, and a day-care 
nursery, all of a high quality design and construction. The all-in cost 
of this scheme came to $70,000 per unit, and its financing required a 
first mortgage of $35,000 per unit funded under the provincial government's 
Rental Start Program, which would provide mortgage funds to the project 
at 3% below the prime rate for a period of seven years; the maximum loan 
available under the federal governments' Canada Rental Supply Plan 
(CRSP) of $15,000 per unit, interest-free for fifteen years; a subsidy 
of $10,000 per unit from the Core Area Initiative; and private equity 
funds of $10,000 per unit. All of these subventions were necessary; 
without them the project could not proceed. And although this particular 
financing structure was specified in only one of the three short-listed 
projects, there is no doubt that the other two were similarly dependent 
on public subventions. The importance of such federal and provincial 
subventions, and in some instances even municipal subventions in the form 
of property tax concessions, in the production of economic rental housing 
has already been discussed but cannot be overemphasized: without subven-
tions. there can not be any new rental housing produced, except in rare 
instances where the developer enjoys an unusual financial advantage 
deriving from some circumstance peculiar to his own operation. But a 
vigorous, widespread, rental housing program cannot be mounted on the basis 
of such peculiar circumstances. 
When the government of Canada was changed with the election of the 
Conservative Party in September 1984, one of the first effects which was 
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felt in the housing industry was the suspension of the CRSP funds, 
pending a review of this program by the new government as part of their 
over-all review of existing government programs. The suspension of 
CRSP meant that none of the Edmonton Street proposals could be implemented. 
The disagreement over the use of the site brought the selection process 
to a halt; the suspension of the CRSP funds has probably terminated the 
housing project. 
Even if CRSP funds were eventually restored, it is not likely that 
any of the short-listed proponents would be disposed to start the process 
again. Discussions with one of them indicated that he would be very 
hesitant about picking up all the threads again, and going to the trouble 
and expense of re-working them in terms of the present financial and 
political circumstances, which are no longer the same as when he first 
submitted his proposal; nor is it likely that he would have the incentive 
to again enter the hazardous and frustrating world of uncertainty, 
vulnerability, short-term commitment and multi-level political expediency 
which is the present context for core-area housing programs. 
It is possible that the various public agencies such as the Core Area 
Initiative, the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation, and the Winnipeg 
Housing Rehabilitation Corporation, if they combined all their resources, 
might be able to mount a rental housing program in the area north of Ellice 
Avenue, or indeed elsewhere in the core. But without CRSP funds the 
number of dwellings they could produce would be dramatically reduced. It 
has been estimated that only about l/3 of the number of dwellings could 
be produced without that additional source of funds as would be possible 
with it. And of course, none of the other government programs can be taken 
for granted any more than the federal government's CRSP. 
This episode is only one of many that have occurred with respect to 
the difficulty of mounting housing projects in the core area, and indicates 
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how hazardous and unreliable the present arrangements are for the financ-
ing of rental housing and how necessary it is, for that purpose, to 
replace those arrangements with a system which makes available the 
necessary public funds on a stable, reliable basis, for a long enough 
period to allow the achievement of agreed housing objectives in the core 
area. 
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1.3 Shortcomings of Present Organizational System 
Further insights into the deficiencies of the present system can 
be found in the events surrounding the planning of the North Portage 
redevelopment project. When the Core Area Initiative was established 
it was generally understood that the framework for its activities 
would be the three Sectors and 13 Programs described in the publication 
Proposed Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, dated June 1981, and that its 
mandate was to pursue the stated objectives in all of these areas. 
Among the 13 Programs was Program 7 of Sector II - North of Portage 
Redevelopment. The objective of this program, was 11 to encourage new 
commercial and residential investment by undertaking a major redevelop-
ment of the North Portage area. 115 It was expected that this would be 
one of the high-profile undertakings of the Core Area Initiative office. 
In late March and early April of 1983 the Winnipeg news media 
carried reports that a number of large-scale developments were being 
contemplated for the North Portage Area. These reports rumored the 
possibility of an arena and a hotel in locations adjacent to Portage 
Avenue, and a new CBC building and a National Research Council labora-
tory on the old St. Paul's College site. Eventually it was confirmed 
that such a scheme had in fact been prepared and was being studied by 
the political authorities, in particular the federal government. 
Commenting on this proposal, in a special editorial published in 
the Winnipeg Free Press on April 22, 1984, and another on May 3, the 
5 Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Policy Committee - Proposed Winnipeg 
Core Area Initiative, June 1981, Program 7: North of Portage 
Development, p. 12. 
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author argued that the public monies which would have to be spent on these 
projects would be better spent on housing because housing has a much 
greater potential for stimulating new vitality in the central area; 
moreover, the old St. Paul's College site would be too small to accomodate 
other research facilities which might want to cluster aroung the NRC 
laboratory, and it would therefore be more appropriately located elsewhere. 
Mr. Jack Levit, President of Lakeview Development Limited, had been 
uneasy about the scheme referred to by the news media, fearing that the 
proper redevelopment of the central area might be jeopardized by ill-
considered commitments to the wrong kinds of projects. When he read the 
author's editorials, he was triggered into action. The two met to discuss 
a strategy which might lead to a more carefully considered plan for the 
city's core. Out of that meeting emerged the idea of the Winnipeg 
Developers Consortium. 
Mr. Levit convened a meeting of the principals of five of the major 
development companies in the city to discuss the idea. The members of 
this group are among the largest and most successful developers in Win-
nipeg, whose work includes not only some of the biggest and most presti-
gious projects in the city, but is also very extensive internationally. 
The members of the consortium were Lakeview Development Ltd., Metropolitan 
Properties Ltd., Qualico Development Ltd., Shelter Corporation of Canada, 
and The Imperial Group. These companies are all Winnipeg-based and have 
their head-offices in the city. The principals of the companies were 
all born in Winnipeg, and their companies have all grown and prospered 
here. At that meeting, all of them agreed that an effort must be made 
to ensure that the plan for North Portage would be the best that could be 
mounted in terms of achieving the revitalization objective, and that it 
must of course also make economic sense, and be appropriate to both the 
Portage Avenue location and the Winnipeg context. They all shared the 
view that because of their background and experience, and the fact that 
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they earned their livelihood as developers, and did so with considerable 
success, they could make an important contribution, not only to the 
development of the North Portage project, but perhaps even more importantly 
to its planning. On this basis, they agreed to join together as a 
consortium, under the style of the Winnipeg Developers Consortium, and 
to offer their combined services in the preparation and execution of the 
redevelopment plan. 
At about this time rumors were circulating that a new agency was to 
be established, separate from the Core Area Initiative office, to prepare 
a plan for North Portage. The rumors were confirmed with the creation of 
the Administrative Task Force on North Portage, made up of appointees of 
the three governments, all of them being public servants. The job of 
this Task Force was 11 to accomplish the formulation of a major develop-
ment plan and the detailing of specific development proposals for the 
implementation of such a plan, including developmental mechanisms in 
respect to the geographical area of North Portage. 116 
Because of the ambiguity surrounding the question of the proper body 
to which to offer their services, the members of the Consortium decided 
that in the first instance they would approach the Policy Committee of 
the Core Area Initiative, which comprised the federal Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigration, the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, the provincial Minister 
of Urban Affairs, the Hon. Eugene Kostyra, and His Worship Mayor Bill 
Norrie of the City of Winnipeg. On May 16, 1983 representatives of the 
Consortium met with the three members of the Policy Committee to discuss 
6 North Portage Administrative Task Force - Statement of Objectives -
attached to letter from J.C. MacKay, Chairman, Task Force on North 
Portage to Earl Levin, May 25, 1983, inviting proposals for North 
Portage Development 
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the possible involvement of the Consortium in the planning and developm~nt 
process. They stated that the skills and resources of the private sector 
should be an integral part of the process and suggested that representa-
tives of the Consortium be included as members of the planning team. The 
members of the Policy Committee thanked the Consortium for their proposal 
and assured them it would be given serious consideration. 
No further communication was received by the Conso~tium with respect 
to their proposal to the Policy Committee, but on June 7, 1983 they were 
invited to appear before the Task Force to make a presentation as part 
of the formal process of hearings which the Task Force was conducting. 
In carrying out its assignment, the Task Force had engaged the services 
of various consulting firms and other experts in the several fields which 
were relevant to the creation of a development concept for the North 
Portage site. Among these was a firm of architects who were engaged as 
the site planners and designers to the Task Force. The Task Force was 
now inviting private developers and any other interested parties to meet 
with them and to present to the Task Force their ideas and proposals for 
the redevelopment of the site. The hearings were being conducted in 
camera assuring that theiideas and proposals of the private parties could 
be offered and held in confidence. 
The Consortium chose not to offer any development proposal or to 
advocate any particular project, but to limit their presentation to the 
single issue of the involvement of the private sector in the planning as 
well as the development of the project. In the brief which they submitted 
to the Task Force on that occasion they said: 
It is this issue which we want to address in our submission. 
We do not see anywhere in the present arrangements for 
p1anning and developing the area north of Portage, any 
recognition of the role of the private sector, or any attempt 
to create the climate which will attract private sector 
participation in the enterprise . 
... On the 16th of May our group met with the Honourable Mr. 
7 
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Axworthy, the Honourable Mr. Kostyra, and His Worship 
Mayor Norrie, to discuss the matter, and to offer our 
services in the planning and development of the North 
Portage area. In reply to their question we advised 
them that we thought the most effective way of drawing 
upon the expertise and resources of the developers group 
would be to appoint two of their representatives to the 
planning team. Instead of that, we have been invited 
to meet with the Task Force and make a submission .... 
We are still strongly of the opinion that the private 
developers must be directly involved in the planning 
activity as part of the planning team, if the plan 
which is produced is to have the confidence of those 
who will ultimately be expected to provide the invest-
ment capital and the expertise to carry it out .... 
We understand that a design consultant has been appointed 
to prepare a design for the development of the area. 
This is of course an important part of the planning 
process~ but the expertise of the developer is equally 
important .... 
In the light of the foregoing, we recommend that a 
working group be designated, comprising the design 
consultants and representatives of the developers 
associated together in this submission; the responsi-
bility of this working group to be to act as a team 
in the preparation of a plan for the development of 
the North of Portage area; the plan to include an 
implementation program which can be undertaken with a 
minimum of delay. We further recommend that a member 
of the Task Force be designated as the co-ordinator 
of this working group, on a day-to-day basis and to 
provide the linkage or liaison between the working 
group and the Task Force.? 
Winnipeg Developers Consortium - Brief to Task Force on North 
Portage, June 30, 1983. 
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The Task Force listened to the presentation, thanked the delegation, 
and asked whether the Consortium intended to submit a development pro-
posal. They replied that such was their intention but they hoped that 
the involvement of the private sector in the planning process would be 
more integral than simply that of the submission of separate, uncor-
related, special interest proposals by ~arious private companies in 
competition with one another, and in response to proposal calls for frag-
mented components of the over-all scheme. The Consortium received no 
further reaction from the Task Force on its proposal for private sector 
participation in the design process. On June 30th they met again with 
the Task Force and submitted a plan for the redevelopment of the North 
Portage site. 
The Task Force published its report in mid-July, 1983. Five major 
submissions and a variety of minor submissions were reviewed in the 
document, including the plan which had been prepared by the Task Force's 
design consultant, as well as the scheme prepared by the Winnipeg 
Developers Consortium. 
The next communication which the Consortium had with the public 
authorities was a letter from the Executive Policy Committee of the City 
of Winnipeg, dated August 18, and signed by Councillor J.A. Ernst, 
acknowledging the Consortium's submission to the Task Force, and inviting 
the Consortium to an "in camera" review of their proposal. On August 24, 
representatives of the Consortium appeared before the Executive Policy 
Committee and presented to them the same proposal they had presented 
to the Task Force on June 30. The Consortium's appearance before the 
Executive Policy Committee was part of a review of the Task Force's report 
and recommendations which the EPC was conducting in order to formulate 
their own recommendations to City Council. In conducting this review 
they were holding a series of "in camera" meetings with the proponents 
of the various schemes, and other interested persons. 
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By early September the EPC had completed their review and were 
ready to pass their recommendations on to Council. The Consortium was 
concerned that their own proposals for organizing and implementing the 
redevelopment scheme were clearly understood because they had only 
generally outlined them in their presentation to the EPC. They there-
fore asked to appear before Council to provide further information on 
these matters. On September 12 representatives of the Consortium 
appeared before Council and submitted a brief setting out in greater 
detail the Consortium's idea for joint public sector- private sector 
participation in the process of planning and developing the North 
Portage site. In part their brief read as follows: 
* 
1. The Winnipeg Developers Consortium would be 
incorporated as a private, non-profit corpora-
tion. Representatives of the member companies 
of the Consortium would comprise the Board of 
Directors. This non-profit corporation would 
be responsible for arranging the financing, 
planning, design, development, syndication, 
management, and mOJ:~itoring of the project or 
projects which it would undertake. The Corpora-
tion would arrange the initial working capital, 
which would be recovered from the first draw on 
the financing. 
2. Investment in the project would be open to the 
public. Syndication would probably be the 
vehicle employed. The Consortium would invest 
from 50% to 100% of the equity funds of the 
syndication, depending on the take-up by other 
investors. It would be the intention of the 
Consortium to make 50% of the ownership of the 
project or projects available to other investors 
at the same price as will be paid by the members 
of the Consortium. If investment by others falls 
short of that 50% mark~ the Consortium would 
take up the balance. The proposed public develop-
ment corporation* would of course be free to invest 
in the syndication if they chose to do so. 
At that time there was talk of establishing a public development corpora-
tion to be responsible for the development of the North Portage site, 
This eventually emerged as the North Portage Development Corporation. 
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3. It is important to understand that the non-profit 
corporation and the syndication are two separate 
entities. The non-profit corporation would operate 
strictly at cost, without profit, in the areas of 
responsibility stated in para. 1. above. The 
syndication would be offered through the vehicle of 
a limited partnership. The investors in the syndica-
tion or limited partnership would receive returns 
on their investment which would be determined by the 
profit earned by the project or projects. The 
profits would be the revenues remaintng after deduc-
tion of the debt servicing and operating costs. 
7. The Consortium would want to work directly with the 
public sector development corporation which has 
been proposed for the North of Portage area. We 
would hope, however, that the mandate of that 
corporation would be extended to cover the Main 
Street and East Yard projects which we are su~gesting 
so that there would be a concerted and well-coordinated 
public-private effort of great purpose, energy, and 
resources to make central Winnipeg into an attractive 
and lively sector of the city. 
9. We believe that the concept of a private sector non-
profit corporation working directly with the proposed 
public sector development corporation and with other 
appropriate public agencies is the most effective 
means of revitalizing the city's core. Indeed we doubt 
whether an effective redevelopment program is possible 
without this public-private linkage. 
10. The members of the Consortium have said from the 
outset that we are not motivated by the profits that 
may be realized from the North of Portage redevelopment 
project; and in fact we have pointed out that the 
profitability of the project divided among five large 
development companies is very marginal. Our main 
concern is the revitalization of the central part of our 
city. If this could be achieved, then at some time in 
the future central Winnipeg might again become attractive 
to investors, and the members of the Consortium would 
likely at that time again undertake developments from 
which we could realize profitable returns. But at the 
present time, the prospect of pr@fits from the present 
proposal is not what motivates us. We simply want to 
see the centre of our city made vital and flourishing. 
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And as an indication of our good faith, we are 
offering to participate in the redevelopment not 
only of the North of Portage area on the basis 
of a non-p~ofit corporation and a limited partner-
ship as described above, but also of other key 
areas in the centre of the city, should the govern-
ments concerned wish to proceed with them as well. 
More than that, we are prepared to make participation 
in the ownership of these projects open to others, 
including the public sector development corporation, 
to the extent of 50% of the required equity. We are 
not aware of any similar or equivalent offer ever hav-
ing been made by the private sector developers of 
any other city. We trust that the public authorities 
will recognize the sincerity of our motives, and the 
great potential for achievement inherent in our 
proposal, and will join with us in this momentous 
undertaking.8 
The public authorities, unfortunately did not recognize either the 
sincerity of the Consortium's motives, or the great potential for achieve-
ment in their proposal. There was no response to the brief. It was as 
though it had never been presented. 
On December 16, 1983, the governments of Canada, Manitoba, and Winnipeg 
entered into an agreement establishing the North Portage Development 
Corporation. The Corporation has, since its establishment proceeded on 
the basis of inviting proposals from interested developers, and has been 
having discussions with those who have responded to their invitation. 
But this is the traditional procedure followed by the public sector, and 
is simply a repetition of the procedure followed by the Task Force a year 
earlier. The same ground is being covered in exactly the same way. There 
has been no attempt to integrate the private sector into the planning 
8 Winnipeg Developers Consortium - Brief to Task Force on North Portage, 
June 30, 1983. 
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process as a partner. Consultations with private sector representatives 
have only been intended to gather information and ideas which the North 
Portage Development Corporation can either accept or reject as it formu-
lates its own concept for the redevelopment of the North Portage site. 
It is ironical, however, to note the extent to which lip-service 
is paid to the need for private sector participation in the redevelopment 
scheme. On September 25, 1984, a one-day conference called "Winnipeg 
2000: Exploring Strategic Development Options" was held in Winnipeg, 
sponsored jointly by the Institute of Urban Studies of the University of 
Winnipeg, and the Institute for Sbcial and Economic Research of the 
University of Manitoba. 9 The keynote speaker at the conference was 
Stephen Dragos, the former Executive Vice-President of the Milwaukee 
(Wisconsin) Redevelopment Corporation. In a public lecture on the pre-
vious day at the University of Winnipeg, Mr. Dragos emphasized that a 
fiscal partnership between private and public enterprise, and a vision 
for the future are the key components in the process of turning around 
a declining city. He pointed out that in the Milwaukee situation, the 
redevelopment corporation was made up of private business people and 
private volunteers, which initially raised $16 million in equity from 45 
corporations as "seed money" for the subsequent redevelopment. In com-
paring the Milwaukee Development Corporation with the North Portage 
Development Corporation he said "You've got three levels of government 
involved, but where are the developers?" 
There was much sympathy with Mr. Dragos's observations expressed by 
the participants in the conference, and time and again the question was 
posed "why can't we do that kind of thing here in Winnipeg?" No one 
9 For information see Lynda Newman and Deborah Lyon, Winnipeg 2000: 
Exploring Strategic Development Options (Winnipeg: Institute of 
Urban Studies, 1984). 
I,' 
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attending the conference was aware that Winnipeg's private sector 
developers had offered to do the same thing, adapted and appropriate 
to the rather different circumstances which prevail here, as compared 
with those in Milwaukee, but had received no response to their offer. 
Editorial comment in the various news media in the city have also 
asked the question "where are the developers?" but in the main these 
have been merely rhetorical queries. The North Portage Corporation has 
also stated that without the private sector developers the project can-
not proceed. But this is self-evident: if the private sector investor 
and developer are going to finance and build the project, or at least 
the private sector components of the project, then it goes without 
saying that th.e project cannot proceed without them. And clearly, this 
is how the Corporation regards the role of the private sector, simply 
as investors in and developers of the project whose form and substance 
the Corporation itself has formulated and in which the private sector 
has had no decision-making role. The North Portage Development Corpora-
tion expects the private sector simply to respond to proposal calls 
according to the traditional practice for the implementation of projects 
sponsored by public authorities. 
This traditional practice may be appropriate to achieve the construc-
tion of a public building or structure; it is not appropriate to achieve 
the redevelopment of an important site in the central area of the city as 
part of a core area revitalization program. That is probably the reason 
after a year and a half of study and design there is still no firm plan for 
the redevelopment of North Portage, and no assurance that private invest-
ment wi 11 be ava i 1 ab 1 e for those components. of the concept which have so 
far been indicated. 
If the revitalization of the core area is to be achieved, in the most 
effective and efficient way, with the fullest contribution from all of the 
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interests involved in such an undertaking, the present system of planning 
by the public sector, with proposal calls from the public sector andre-
sponding proposal submissions from the private sector, as two separate 
and virtually isolated components of the process, is not the way to do it. 
The traditional relationship between the public sector and the private 
sector in such an undertaking should be revised allowing both sectors to 
be more closely integrated in the entire process, from the initial con-
ception of the undertaking to its final implementation. 
This study seeks to develop a model under which such a new, more 
closely integrated relationship between the public sector and the private 
sector would be possib~e in the field of housing development in the core 
area. 
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2.0 THE MODEL 
2.1 General Description 
Several important facts emerge from the foregoing discussions: 
there is now a general consensus that the development of housing 
on a much broader scale than presently prevails is essential to 
the revitalization of the core area; 
any market rental housing at the present time requires a subsidy 
of about 50% of the cost to make it economically feasible; 
subsidies that have been provided from time to time by the various 
governments have been effective within the limits of the programs, 
but they have been too unreliable in their availability and 
duration, and inadequate in too many respects to constitute the 
basis of a specific, concerted, core area development program; 
the organizational mechanism for delivery of projects does not 
permit sufficient or appropriate input by the private sector into 
the planning stage of large-scale development such as the core 
area revitalization program to ensure the fullest possible 
contribution by both the public sector and the private sector, 
and the formulation of the best possible plan; 
a new and better arrangement than now prevails is necessary for 
both the supply of public funds for housing development, and for 
the production of housing on the basis of those public subsidies; 
monies which are provided for housing development as an essential 
component of core area revitalization need not be in the form of 
outright grants or interest-bearing loans. The federal government's 
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CRSP funds are provided interest-free for the first 15-years, 
after which they are subject to the prevailing interest rate. 
Here there is the clear recognition that interest-free loans 
for a lengthy period are necessary for the economic feasibility 
of rental housing, and that government recognizes this fact 
and accepts it as an element in the structure of public sub-
ventions to encourage the production of economic rental housing. 
If large sums of government money are to be loaned for the construction 
of housing in Winnipeg's core area, it would be desirable that those monies 
were not loaned directly to a private developer, not only because of the 
political difficulties involved in selecting the developer, but also because 
of the principle that government should remain at arms length from private 
corporations and even from the projects themselves in such undertakings, 
and it would be best if a non-governmental intermediary were interposed 
between the housing projects and the funding government. The appropriate 
intermediary arrangement is a number of non-profit development corporations 
based in designated sectors of the core area, within whose boundaries the 
activities of each development corporation would be confined. 
This study is focussed on two such locations for the purpose of 
developing a model which might then have a wider application. The two 
areas are the Historic Winnipeg area, and the North of Ellice triangle. 
The model which is now taking shape has the two major components 
alluded to above - a financial component and an organizational component. 
The financial component embodies the idea that government would 
provide 50% of the cost of an approved housing project; private investors 
would provide 25%; and the remaining 25% would be raised by mortgage. 
liGovernment" as referred to here could be any of the city, provincial, 
or federal governments, or any combination of them. The 50% cost advanced 
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by government would be in the form of an interest-free loan to a locally 
based non-profit development corporation, to be repaid to the government 
over a period of time out of the revenues generated by the project. 
The organizational component has as its central feature a non-
profit development corporation, whose membership would be made up of 
property owners and tenants of the designated area. The role of this 
corporation would be to prepare a development plan for their area with 
housing as the main program of the plan, and to be responsible for 
carrying out the housing projects as well as any other projects con-
tained in the plan. In performing this role the development corporation 
would enter into a partnership with the private investors in the 
housing project or projects, and would act as the channel through 
which the government funds would flow to the project(s) and through 
which revenues generated by the project(s) would flow back in repayment 
to government. 
It is proposed that the funding Government's financial commitment 
be for a limited amount and for a limited period of time. Analysis 
indicates that it should be possible for the central area of the city, 
as here defined - the area bounded by the CPR right-of-way on the north, 
Gomez Street and the Red River on the east, the Assiniboine River on the 
south, and Colony/Balmoral/Isabel on the west - to absorb some 2500 
dwelling units over a ten-year period, over and above the housing 
component proposed for the North Portage site. On the basis of current 
costs it would require about $150 million to build this housing. The 
model presented here proposes that Government provide 50% of this cost 
(in the form of a loan) which would come to $75 million over a ten-year 
period. It is further proposed in this model that a maximum of 500 units 
or $15 million be allocated to any given corporation, so that the poten-
tial number of corporations would be limited to five. The five sectors 
of the city's central area within which each corporation would operate 
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respectively would be: 
l. The North of Ellice Triangle 
2. The Historic Winnipeg area 
3. The South Point Douglas area 
4. The Centennial/West Alexander area 
5. The South Portage area/CN East Yard. 
It should be noted that it is unlikely that 500 units would be 
built in the Centennial/West Alexander area. A recent study by the 
Main Street Revitalization Project found that only about 157 units can 
be accommodated in this area on sites which are available without 
expropriation and demolition of existing structures. Assuming this to 
be the absorption limit (i.e., 157 units) for new housing in this area, 
the funding for the residual (i.e., 343) units would be made available 
to one or more of the other corporations where there is an active demand, 
at some agreed cut-off time during the ten-year period. 
The South Portage/CN East Yard area presents some difficulties 
which presently cannot be resolved. The future development of the East 
Yard and the time when it might be made available for development are 
questions which cannot be answered. However, if the yard becomes 
available for residential development within the time-frame indicated 
here, a significant part of the housing built would be luxury condomin-
iums; this type of housing is not contemplated for inclusion in the 
program proposed in this model. One can also assume that the East Yard 
site would be more attractive as a place to live than the South Portage 
area, and therefore that the South Portage area would lose some of its 
potential market to the East Yard. Given these possibilities, and the 
possibility of about 350 units being transferred from the Centennial/West 
Alexander site, the coupling of the South Portage area with the East Yard 
is not an unreasonable suggestion for present purposes. 
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The method of operatrton visualized at the present stage of the 
investigation would involve the following steps: 
l. The locally based non-profit development corporation would 
be established under an agreement with government whereby 
government would agree to lend the corporation 50% of the 
cost of a housing project but would initially only advance 
sufficient funds to enable the corporation to prepare its 
plan; the remaining funds would be committed only when the 
plan has been prepared and approved, the necessary arrange-
ments put in place for private sector investment, mortgage 
financing, land acquisition, etc. 
2. The corporation would engage the services of a consultant 
for the preparation of a long-range development plan for 
their designated area. This service can be available at a 
very modest cost, or indeed at no cost at all. The Institute 
of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, as part of its out-
reach program, is prepared to act as a consultant to community 
groups on a wide variety of urban issues. The preparation 
of a long range area development plan would fall within the 
scope of its activities, and there is a reasonable assurance 
that an arrangement could be made with them to carry out such 
an assignment on terms that would be mutually acceptable. 
More than that, it is possible that the Institute would be 
prepared to act as advisor to the corporation in all its affairs. 
3. When the broad general plan has been prepared, the corporation 
would seek out long-term investors and enter into a partner-
ship with them for the purpose of developing a housing project. 
They would also seek out a developer who is prepared to provide 
the technical and professional skills required to prepare the 
plans for the housing project, on the basis of no profit, but 
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simply of cost-recovery for this stage of the development, 
on the firm agreement that he will earn his normal profit on 
the construction phase of the project. The corporation and 
its partners would negotiate for the acquisition of the land 
and arrange for the mortgage. 
4. The partnership would then advise the government that the 
scheme is ready for implementation and the government would 
release the balance of the 50% of the cost of the project, 
and this would put all of the other agreements into effect 
and work would commence. 
5. First call on the revenues generated by the project would be 
for payment of the debt servicing and operating costs. After 
these costs have been met, the long-term investors would 
6. 
have the next claim on the revenues up to a maximum percentage 
of their equity investment as provided in their agreement with 
the corporation (say 10%); after that the residual net revenues 
would be used to repay the government loan, up to a maximum 
percentage of the loan amount, as provided in the agreement; 
and if there is still an unconsumed residue of net revenues 
it would be shared on a basis provided for in the agreement 
between the long-term investors and the corporation (say 50/50). 
The corporation's share would be returned to the government in 
repayment of the loan. 
If the housing project is sold, the corporation's share of the 
proceeds would be used to repay the government 1 oan, if there 
is still an outstanding balance at that time. When the loan has 
been repaid and the corporation still holds assets, those assets 
would be used to undertake another project, whether housing or 
some other type of area improvement. 
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7. The corporation would have first refusal on the purchase of 
the private long-term investors 1 share of the partnership. 
It could also have the option of providing the management 
services for the completed project. 
8. Operating costs of the corporation would be provided either 
from the government loan which would include this cost as a 
cost of the project, or from an appropriate claim on the 
revenues generated by the project. 
The composition of the Board of the corporation could vary from one 
to the other. As a basic aeneral model, however, it would be useful to 
think of a Board of nine members. Five of these would be appointed by 
the existing neighbourhood council or appropriate association; two would 
be appointed by the Mayor of the City of l~innipeg; one would be appointed 
by the funding Government; and one would be appointed by the Institute of 
Urban Studies of the University of Winnipeg. 
The corporation would be incorporated as a Corporation Without Share 
Capital under Part xxii, of the Corporations Act, SM.l976 c. 40. Under 
this Act, Articles of Incorporation must be completed and certified in 
order to establish a corporation. Item 5 of these Articles sets out the 
undertaking to which the corporation is restricted. The development 
corporations proposed in this model would complete Item 5 of the Articles 
of Incorporation as follows: 
5. The undertaking of the corporation is restricted 
to the following; 
1. To foster and promote the economic, social, 
and physical welfare of that area of the City 
of Winnipeg in the Province of Manitoba 
generally known as ... but whose specific 
boundaries are ... through the provision of 
housing and other types of development. 
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2. To represent the members of the Corporation 
in the preparation and implementation of 
plans and projects for the development of 
the aforesaid area, and in the negotiation 
of and entering into contracts with various 
levels of government and with private persons 
and corporations for the purpose of preparing 
and implementing such plans and projects. 
3. To promote legislation affecting the aforesaid 
area and to oppose or support, as the case 
may be, any legislation by any level of govern-
ment or authority as the same may affect the area. 
In entering into joint-venture agreements with private investors to 
carry out housing or other development projects, a separate joint-venture 
company would be created. The composition of the Board, and the under-
takings of that new company would be set out in the Articles of Incorpora-
tion and the By-laws of that company. 
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2.2 Testing the Financial Component 
In order to examine the effects of the financial structure 
postulated in the model, three hypothetical housing projects were 
formulated. Since the model was being developed with reference to 
two particular locations in the central area, - the Historic Winnipeg 
area, and the Central Park, North of Ellice area - the hypothetical 
housing projects obviously should have reference to these locations. 
Moreover, since a significant part of the housing potential of the 
Historic Winnipeg area is in the recycling of existing warehouse 
structures, an examination of the model in terms of a recycling 
project as well as in terms of new construction would be appropriate. 
Accordingly, three hypothetical projects were formulated: one for new 
construction in the Historic Winnipeg area; one for recycling an existing 
warehouse for residential use in the Historic Winnipeg area; and one 
for new construction in the triangle of land north of Ellice Avenue, 
between Notre Dame and Balmoral. Each of these is examined. 
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2.2.1 Hypothetical New Construction Project in the Historic Winnipeg Area 
Assumptions 
1. The site lies east of Main Street in the McDermot/Bannatyne/ 
Market area, in the vicinity of Stephen Juba park. Given the 
recent improvements to Bannatyne Avenue, and the creation of 
the riverside park, it seems clear that these public investments 
in upgrading the streetscape and the general physical environ-
ment provide the most attractive ambience for a new housing 
project in the Historic Winnipeg area. The site of the 
hypothetical project in this exercise will be referred to as 
the East of Main Site. 
2. The site is clear of any structure and its present use is for 
surface parking. There is considerable area in the indicated 
location which meets this criterion. Sites without buildings 
are generally less costly for development than sites with 
structures that have to be demolished. 
3. The density of development of the project is 80 units/acre. 
This seems an appropriate development density for the indicated 
location, and for a project which is essentially experimental 
in nature, since there is no housing there at present. This 
project, were it implemented, would be the first of its kind, 
and accordingly should have a high quality of design and construc-
tion, and the density should not be so great as to require 
high-rise structures, nor yet so low as to be inappropriate 
to an urban central location. 
4. The size of the hypothesized site is about half an acre. At 
the indicated density of 80 units per acre this could accomodate 
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40 residential units. This may be regarded as a very modest 
undertaking, but given the fact that the market reponse to 
housing in this area cannot be foreseen, it is deemed prudent 
that the first venture be fairly modest in scale, but not so 
small as to have no impact on the character of the area and 
no influence on the possibility of further development. 
5. Examination of property values in the area indicated that 
generally they run at about $400,000 per acre. Analysis of 
various site values and other indicators led to the adoption 
of a value of $229,360 for a half-acre site in this location. 
For a development of 40 units this works out to a value of 
$5,734 per unit for land, which may be somewhat high, but 
was felt to be acceptable because of the special circumstances 
of this exercise. 
6. Construction costs of $2,077,800 for this project are based 
on construction costs of a project recently proposed for a 
site in downtown Winnipeg. The figure for that project came 
to $51,945 per unit, which included the cost of parking 
accommodation. Forty cars can be accommodated on 14000-
16000 sq. ft. and since the hypothetical site is half an acre 
(21,780 sq. ft.) the parking would only require a single 
level. If the parking were not completely below grade, the 
cost would be reduced because the cost of ventilating, light-
ing, and heating would be avoided. It is assumed here that 
40 parking spaces would be provided, and that the cost of 
$51,945 per unit would be sufficient to build not only the 
apartments, but also the parking accommodation. 
7. It is assumed that of the 40 units, twenty or 50% would be 
one-bedroom; five or 12~% would be one bedroom/den; five or 
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12~% would be 2 bedroom/1 bathroom; and ten or 25% would be 
2 bedroom/2 bathroom. 
8. It is assumed that the rental rates for these apartments would 
be as follows: 
1 bedroom 
1 bedroom/den 
2 bedroom/1 bathroom 
2 bedroom/2 bathroom 
$520/month 
600/month 
620/month 
700/month 
9. It is assumed that the rental rate for the parking stalls 
would be $50/stall/month. 
10. It is assumed that the laundry facilities provided would 
produce revenues of $10/month/apartment. 
The financial analysis for this hypothetical project follows. 
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Notes to East of Main Site - Preliminary Development Budget 
l. Land Cost is $229,360 as set out in item 5 of Assumptions, above. 
2. Construction Cost is $2,077,800 as set out in item 6 of Assumptions, 
above. 
3. Construction Management Fee is based on 3~% of Construction Cost. 
4. Development Overhead is based on 5% of Total Cost less Casual 
Revenue. This item includes the cost of running an office during 
the construction period, plus an allowance for risks or contin-
gencies that don't appear elsewhere in the budget. 
5. Technical Fees are based on 5% of Construction Cost. 
6. Operating Costs used in this preliminary budget are 50% of the cost 
estimated in the Revenue/Expense Analysis for the base year 1986 
for eight months lease-up period (comprising last two months of 
construction plus six months after substantial completion). That 
is, Operating Costs shown here are 8/12 of 50% of the Total Expenses 
shown on the Revenue/Expense Analysis. This item includes utilities, 
repairs and maintenance, property tax, and insurance. 
7. Special Costs includes special assessments and/or off-site costs 
such as hook-up charges, etc. 
8. Administrative Costs includes any administrative costs not included 
under Development Costs, such as travel costs, courier costs, long-
distance telephone charges, etc. 
9. Profit is based on 12% of Total Cost before Casual Revenue. This profit 
goes to the developer if he is not an equity participant in the project. 
10. Marketing Costs are based on 2.25 times the Effective Revenue for 
one month (i.e., one month's revenue@ 5% vacancy). 
ll. Financing Costs include an Application Fee of $100/unit for the first 
50 units and $50/unit thereafter ($4000 for the 40 units in this 
project) plus an Insurance Fee on the permanent mortgage of 3~% of 
the mortgage amount, plus interest payments on the mortgage advanced, 
which is here assumed to be advanced over an eight-month period and 
to carry an interest rate of 12~% on a 35 year term. 
12. Casual Revenue includes the revenue which will be received over the 
eight-month lease-up period. It is assumed that there will be an average 
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occupancy of 50% during the eight-months of the lease-up period 
and the casual revenue will therefore be 8/12 of 50% of the Gross 
Revenue shown on the Revenue/Expense Analysis. 
Notes to East of Main - Operating Budget 
1. Revenue and Expenses are projected to increase by 6% annually. 
2. Debt Service is based on a first mortgage of $786,622 at 12~% 
amortized over 35 years. 
3. Net Revenue distribution assumed to be as follows: 
a) Private investors assumed to earn 10% return on 
their equity (786,622) prior to any payment to 
the non-profit corporation. 
b) Non-Profit corporation to receive residual revenue up 
to 10% of government loan, after payment to private 
investors; non-profit corporation to return such revenue 
to funding government in repayment of loan. 
c) Private investors and non-profit corporation to share 
any additional project revenue over and above the 
payments indicated in a) and b) above, on a 50/50 
basis. 
d) Sale proceeds (not shown) if any, to be shared by the 
private investors and the non-profit corporation, with 
repayment of private investors taking precedence. 
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Table 1 
East of Main Site - Preliminary Development Budget 
40 Apartments. 
Hard Costs 
Soft 
Land ( 1) 
Construction (2) 
Construction costs 
Construction 
Management Fee (3) 
Costs 
Development Costs 
Development Overhead 
Technical Fees (5) 
Legal and Accounting 
Operating Costs (6) 
Special Costs (7) 
Administrative Costs 
Profit (9) 
Marketing Costs ( 10) 
Financing Costs (11) 
Permanent Loan 
Interest 
Casual Revenue ( 12) 
Total Cost 
229,360 
$2,077,800 
72,723 
2,150,523 
(4) 157,324 
103,890 
20,000 
33,443 
20,000 
(8) 5,000 
377,579 
717,236 
55,361 
31 ,532 
66,076 
97,608 
$ 3,250,088 
103,600 (103,600) 
$ 3,146,488 
- 40 -
Table 2 
East of Main Site - Total Cost Calculation 
TC = Total Cost 
FC = Fixed Cost 
Land 
Construction 
Development Overhead .05TC 
Technical Fees 
Legal and Accounting 
Operating Costs 
Special Costs 
Administrative Costs 
Profit 
Marketing Costs 
Financing Costs 
. 12TC 
Permanent Loan 4000+(.035)(.25TC) 
Interest (4¥-) (8) (_ 25TC) 
Casual Revenue 
Fixed Cost 
$ 229,360 
2,150,523 
103,890 
20,000 
33,443 
20,000 
5,000 
55,361 
2,617,577 
_(103,600) 
$ 2,513,977 
TC = FC + .05TC+ .12TC + 4000+(.035)(.25TC) + (.125) (8) (.25TC) 
IT 
TC = $2,513,977 + .17TC + 4000 + .00875TC + .03125TC 
TC = $2,517,977 +. 19975TC 
.80025TC = $2,517,977 
TC = 2,517,977 
.80025TC 
= $3,146,488 
Construction 
Lease-up 
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Table 3 
East of Main Site - Development Schedule 
10 months 
8 months overlapping with last two 
months of construction schedule 
First mortgage advances - to begin two months prior to completion 
of construction 
Total 
First Mortgage 
Government Loan 
Private Equity 
Table 4 
East of Main Site - Project Capitalization 
$3,146,483 
786,622 @ 12~% for 35 years. 
1 ,573,244 
786,622. 
- 42 -
Table 5 
East of Main Site - Revenue/Expense Analysis 
Base Year 1986 
Revenue 
bedroom apts 20x520xl2 = $124,800 
1 bedroom/den 5x600xl2 = 36,000 
2 bedroom/1 bath 5x620xl2 = 37,200 
2 bedroom/2 bath l0x700xl2 = 84,000 
Parking 
Laundry 
40 stalls @ $50/mo = 40x50xl2 
40 units @ $10/mo = 40xl0xl2 
Expenses 
Operating Expenses 
40 units @ $200/unit/mo. 
Gross Revenue 
Less 5% Vacancy 
Effective Revenue 
Management Fee @5% of Effective Revenue 
Total Expenses 
Revenue before Debt Service 
Debt Service 
Net Revenue 
= 
= 
Annual Revenue 
$ 282,000 
24,000 
4,800 
$ 310,800 
_ill_,540) 
$ 295,260 
96,000 
14,763 
110,763 
184,497 
97,000 
87,497 
Table 6 
,East of Main Site - Operating Budget ($OOO's} 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
---
Revenue (1) Base Year 
Gross Revenue 311 329 349 370 392 416 441 467 495 525 557 590 625 662 702 744 
Less Vacancy @5% 16 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 28 29 31 33 35 37 
Effective Revenue 295 313 332 352 372 395 419 444 471 499 529 560 594 629 667 707 
Expenses (1) 
Operating 96 102 108 115 121 129 136 145 153 162 172 187 198 210 223 236 
Management Fee 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 28 30 32 34 36 
..j:::> 
w 
Total Expenses 111 118 125 133 140 149 157 167 177 187 198 215 228 242 257 272 
Revenue Before Debt Service 184 195 207 219 232 246 262 277 294 312 331 345 366 387 410 485 
Debt Service (2) 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Net Revenue 87 98 110 122 135 149 165 180 197 215 234 248 269 290 313 330 
Distribution of Net Revenue (3) 
To Private Investors: 
10% return on $786,622; 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
50% of residual after payment 6 17 27 38 51 to non-profit corporation. 
To Non-Profit Corporation: 
10% return on $1,573,244 0 19 31 43 56 70 86 101 118 136 155 157 157 157 157 157 
(if available); 
50% of residual. 6 16 27 ,39 51 \II 
point of recovery 
of government loan 
of $1 ,573,244 
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2.2.2 Hypothetical Warehouse Recycling Project in the Historic Winnipeg Area 
Assumptions 
l. The building selected for this exercise is the Gault Building Annex. 
The Gault Building itself was built in 1899-1900 as a four-
storey warehouse. In 1903 two more storeys were added to the 
original structure, and a six-storey extension or annex was built 
on the south side of the building, extending the structure by about 
50 feet. It is this annex, known as the Gault Building Annex 
which is the subject of this hypothetical recycling project. The 
Gault Building and Annex are located at 92-104 Arthur Street. 
2. The cost of the land and the existing building has been assumed 
to be $257,500. This represents a price midway between what is 
at present the owner's asking price for the property and the 
latest purchase offer that has been made for it. 
3. A mixed-use development has been assumed to be the most appropriate 
for the recycled building. The building has six storeys and a 
basement. The proposed redevelopment assumes car parking in the 
basement, office commercial use on the first floor, and apart-
ments on the five remaining floors. 
4. It is assumed that access to the basement parking area can be 
provided by ramping down in the present arched alleyway between 
the Annex and the Gault Building proper. 
5. The gross floor area of the first floor is about 3700 sq. ft. It 
is assumed that about 700 sq. ft. will be lost to circulation and 
other non-leasable uses, leaving a net leasable floor area of 
3000 sq. ft. This floor would be redeveloped for office commer-
cial use. 
- 45 -
6. The gross floor area of each of floors two to six inclusive is 
about 4855 sq. ft. The difference between the area of the first 
floor (the basement is the same size as the first floor) and 
floors two to six inclusive is due to the fact that an arched 
alleyway measuring about ten feet in width and extending the 
height of the first storey has been taken out of the Annex 
Building to provide a covered service lane between the Annex 
and the Gault Building proper. Floors two to six of the Annex 
over-arch this service lane. It is assumed that floors two to 
six inclusive will be redeveloped for residential use, with 
four apartments on each floor. One of these, or 25% would be 
a studio apartment, two of them or 50% would be one-bedroom 
apartments, and one, or 25% would be a two-bedroom apartment. 
7. It is assumed that both the commercial floor space and the 
residential floor space can be renovated for a cost of $30 per 
sq. ft. 
8. It is assumed that the basement can be renovated to provide 10 
parking stalls at a cost of $9000 per stall which includes the 
cost of ramping down from street level. 
9. The size of the floor-plate, and the number, size, and location 
of the windows allows the creation on each residential floor of 
four apartments of unusually large size. The studio apartments 
measure approximately 770 sq. ft., the one-bedroom apartments 
measure approximately 1000 sq. ft., and the two-bedroom apart-
ments measure approximately 1300 sq. ft. 
10. It is assumed that the rent will average $600 per month per unit. 
This works out to the following rates for each apartment type: 
studios 
one-bedroom 
two-bedroom 
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$505/month 
$610/month 
$675/month 
ll. It is assumed that the office commercial use will produce a 
rent of $10 per sq. ft. triple net. The net leasable space 
of 3000 sq. ft. accordingly will produce a net rent of 
$30,000 per year, or $2500 per month. 
12. It is assumed that the parking stalls will rent for $50 per 
month each for a total monthly parking revenue of $500 per 
month or $6000 per year. 
The financial analysis of this hypothetical project follows. 
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Notes to Gault Building Annex- Preliminary Development Budget 
1. Land and Building Costs estimated at average between asking price 
of $300,000 and the most recent purchase price offer of $215,000. 
2. Construction Costs estimated on the following basis: 
Residential - five floors of 4855 @ $30 = 4855x5x30 
Commercial - one floor of 3700 @ $30 = 3700x30 
10 car spaces @ $9000 = 10x9000 = 
Total construction cost 
$728,250 
111,000 
90,000 
$929,250 
3. Construction Management Fee is based on 3~% of Construction Cost. 
4. Development Overhead is based on 5% of Total Cost before Casual 
Revenue. This item includes the cost of running an office during 
the construction period plus an allowance for risks or contingencies 
that don't appear elsewhere in the budget. 
5. Technical Fees are based on 5% of Total Construction Cost. 
6. Operating Costs used in this preliminary budget are 50% of the 
cost estimated in the Revenue/Expense Analysis for the base year 
1986 for a four-month lease-up period for the residential opera-
tion. That is, Operating Costs shown here are 4/12 of 50% of the 
Total Expenses shown on the Revenue/Expense Analysis. This item 
includes utilities, repairs and maintenance, property taxes and 
insurance. 
7. Special Costs includes special assessments and/or off-site costs 
such as hook-up charges, etc. 
8. Administrative Costs includes any administrative costs not included 
under Development Costs, such as travel costs, courier costs, long-
distance telephone charges, etc. 
9. Profit is based on 12% of Total Cost before Casual Revenue. This 
profit goes to the developer if he is not an equity participant in 
the project. 
10. Marketing Costs are based on 2.25 times one month's rent at 5% vacancy 
for the residential and parking components, and 15% of annual revenue 
for the commercial space. 
11. Financing Costs include an Application Fee of $100 per unit for the 
first 50 units and $50 per unit thereafter ($2000 for the 20 units in 
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this project) plus an Insurance Fee on the permanent mortgage of 
3~% of the mortgage amount, plus interest payments on the mortgage 
advanced which is here assumed to be advanced over a four-month 
period and to carry an interest rate of 12~% on a 35 year term. 
12. Casual Revenue includes the revenue which will be received from the 
residential and parking components over the four-month lease-up 
period at 50% occupancy, plus the revenue which will be received 
from the commercial operation for three months. It is assumed that 
the commercial space will be fully occupied on completion of the 
project and it will be leased as from that time; however, it is 
also assumed that lease-up on the residential component will start 
one month before completion of the project and will extend for 
three months beyond that time for a total lease-up time of four 
months. 
Notes to Gault Building Annex - Operating Budget 
l. Revenue and Expenses projected to increase by 6% annually. 
Office space rent increase assumed to occur every 3 years at 
6% annual rate (compounded). 
2. Debt Service is based on a first mortgage of $400,290 at 12~% 
amortized over 35 years. 
3. Net Revenue distribution assumed to be as follows: 
a) Private investors assumed to earn 10% return on their equity 
($400,290) prior to any payment to the non-profit corporation. 
b) Non-profit corporation to receive residual revenue up to 10% 
of government loan after payment to private investors; non-
profit corporation to return such revenues to funding govern-
ment in repayment of loan. 
c) Private investors and non-profit corporation to share any 
additional project revenue over and above the payments 
indicated in a) and b) above, on a 50/50 basis. 
d) Sale proceeds (not shown) if any, to be shared by the private 
investors and the non-profit corporation, with repayment of 
private investors taking precedence. 
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Table 7 
Gault Building Annex - Preliminary Development Budget 
20 apartments 
3000 sq. ft. net leasable office commercial floor space. 
10 parking spaces. 
Hard Costs 
Land and existing building (1) 
Construction (2) 
Apartments 
Commercial 
Parking 
Construction 
Management Fee (3) 
Soft Costs 
Development Costs 
Development Overhead (4) 
Technical Fees (5) 
Legal and Accounting 
Operating Costs (6) 
Special Costs (7) 
Administrative Costs (8) 
Profit (9) 
Marketing Costs (10) 
Financing Costs (11) 
Permanent Loan 
Interest 
Casual Revenue (12) 
Total Cost 
$728,250 
111,000 
90,000 
929,250 
32,524 
80,058 
46,460 
10,000 
9 '188 
10,000 
2,500 
192 '139 
16,010 
16,812 
32,500 
$257,500 
961,774 
350,345 
31 ,219 
32,822 
1,633,660 
(32,500) 
$1,601,160 
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Table 8 
Gault Building Annex - Total Cost Calculation 
TC = Total Cost 
FC = Fixed Cost 
Land and Existing Building $ 257,500 
Construction 961 ,774 
Development Overhead .05TC 
Technical Fees 46,460 
Legal and Accounting 10,000 
Operating Costs 9,188 
Special Costs 10,000 
Administrative Costs 2,500 
Profit . 12TC 
t~arketi ng Costs 31 ,219 
Financing Costs 
Permanent Loan 2000+(.035)(.25TC) 
Interest (4¥_)(4) (.25TC) 
l ,328,641 
Casual Revenue ( 32,500) 
Fixed Cost $ 1,296,141 
TC = FC = .05TC + .12TC + 2000 + (.035)(.25TC) +(.125) (4)(.25TC) 
TC = $1,296,141 + .17TC + 2000 + .00875TC+ .0105Tcrz-
TC = $1,298,141 + .18925TC 
.81075TC = $1,298,141 
TC = $1,298,141 
.81075 = $ 1,601,160 
~ 
·-
Construction 
Lease-up 
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Tab 1 e 9 
Gault Building Annex - Development Schedule 
Four months. 
Four months, overlapping with construction schedule in 
last month. 
First mortgage advances to begin one month prior to completion and 
advances as required to lease-up. 
Table 10 
Gault Building Annex Project Capitalization 
Total Cost $ 1,601,160 
First Mortgage 400,290 
Government Loan 800,580 
Private Equity 400,290 
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Table 1l 
Gault Building Annex - Revenue/Expense Analysis 
Base Year 1986 
Revenue 
20 apartments @ $600/mo. average 
10 parking stalls @ $50/mo 
Expenses 
Operating Expenses 
Gross revenue 
Less 5% vacancy 
Effective Revenue 
20 units @ $200/unit/mo 
Management Fee @ 5% of Effective Revenue 
Total Expenses 
Revenue before debt service (residential) 
Plus Effective Revenue from Commercial space: 
3000 sq. ft. @ $10,00 triple net $30,000 
Less 5% vacancy (l ,500) 
Effective Revenue Commercial 
Gross Revenue before Debt Service 
Debt Service 
Net Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
$ 
$ 
144,000 
6,000 
150,000 
7,500 
142,500 
48,000 
7,125 
$ 55,125 
87,375 
28,500 
115 ,875 
49,000 
$ 66,875 
Table 12 
Gault Building Annex - Operating Budget ( $000 IS) 
Year 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Revenue (1) 
Residential 
Gross Revenue 150 159 169 179 189 201 213 226 239 253 269 285 302 
Less vacancy @ 5% 8 8 8 9 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 15 
Effective Revenue 143 151 160 170 180 191 202 214 227 241 255 271 287 
Commercial 
Gross Revenue 30 30 30 32 32 32 34 34 34 36 36 36 38 
Less vacancy @ 5% 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Effective Revenue 29 29 29 30 30 30 32 32 32 34 34 34 36 
Total Revenue 172 180 189 200 210 221 234 246 259 275 289 305 323 
Expenses (1) 
\.r1 
Operating 48 51 54 57 61 64 68 72 77 81 86 91 96 w 
Management Fee (Res.) 7 8 8 8 9 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 15 
Total Expenses 55 59 62 65 70 74 78 83 88 93 99 105 111 
Revenue Before Debt Service 117 121 127 135 140 147 156 163 171 182 190 200 212 
Debt Service (2) 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Net Revenue 68 72 78 86 91 98 107 114 122 133 141 151 163 
Distribution of Net Revenue (3) 
To private Investors: 
10% return on $400,290; 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
50% of residual after payment 6 10 15 21 to non-profit corporation 
To Non-Profit Corporation: 
10% return on $800,580 28 32 38 46 51 58 67 74 81 81 81 81 81 
(if available); 
50% of residua 1 6 10 \15 
+ 
21) 
point of recovery of 
government loan of $800,580 
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2.2.3 Hypothetical New Construction Project in the North of Ellice Triangle 
Assumptions 
1. The site identified for this project is the half-block of land on 
the east side of Edmonton Street, between Ellice Avenue and 
Qu 1 appelle. This is the site which was acquired by the Core Area 
Initiative from the Firestone Company. The building which still 
occupies the site is used as the office of the Central Park/North 
of Portage Neighbourhood Council, and for purposes of this analy-
sis the site will be referred to as the Firestone site. 
2. The site is just over one acre in size. In their recently-
published Housing Strategy for the North Portage Triangle, the 
Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood Council designates 
this site as appropriate for medium density development. There 
is no indication of the actual density which would be acceptable 
under the medium-density criterion, and accordingly a density 
figure was arrived at indirectly. The density which is being 
contemplated for the housing component of the North Portage site 
(immediately across Ellice Avenue to the south of the Firestone 
site) by the North Portage Development Corporation is about 200 
units per acre. It is also known that one of the short-listed 
proposals submitted in response to the Core Area Initiative pro-
posal call for the development of the Firestone site, proposed a 
project of 144 dwelling units. On this basis, it has been 
assumed here that 100 units per acre would be an acceptable 
medium-density figure, and since the site is almost an acre in 
area, the number of units assumed for this hypothetical develop-
ment is 100 units. 
3. It has also been assumed here that because of its location, 
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commercial development (retail, office, fitness centre, day-care, 
etc.) would be appropriate for the ground floor use of this 
project. An area of 12000 sq. ft. of such commercial space has 
been assumed. 
4. It has been assumed that some parking would be provided on a 
surface lot, and some would be underground. 
5. Because the land is now owned by the Core Area Initiative it is 
assumed that the value of the land ascribed to this site is sub-
ject to greater flexibility than it would be were it privately 
held. The assumption has been made that an appropriate value for 
the land is $3,500 per unit. Since it is proposed to base this 
hypothetical project on 100 units, the value of the land has been 
assumed to be $350,000. 
6. It is recognized that this specific site has been designated for 
development as a park, and not for housing. However, since other 
projects have been proposed for the Firestone site, under the 
conventional methods of financing and developing, it provides an 
opportunity of comparing those methods with the methods proposed 
in this hypothetical model. There are, of course, other sites of 
comparable size in the North of Ellice Triangle, whose land costs 
are probably in the same range as has been here assumed for the 
Firestone site, and the analysis would probably apply to those 
sites with comparable validity. 
The financial analysis of this hypothetical project follows: 
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Notes to Firestone Site- Preliminary Development Budget 
l. Land Costs are as indicated in item 5 of Assumptions. 
2. Construction Costs are based on $52000 per unit exclusive of land 
and parking, for apartment construction and $100 per sq. ft. for 
commercial construction. 
3. Construction Management Fee is based on 3~% of Construction Cost. 
4. Development Overhead is based on 5% of Total Cost before Casual 
Revenue. This item includes the cost of running an office during 
the construction period plus an allowance for risks or contingencies 
that don't appear elsewhere in the budget. 
5. Technical Fees are based on 5% of Construction Cost. 
6. Operating Costs used in this preliminary budget are 50% of the 
cost estimated in the Revenue/Expense Analysis for the Base Year 
1986, for a 10-month lease-up period. That is, Operating Costs 
shown here are 10/12 of 50% of the Total Expenses shown in the 
Revenue/Expense Analysis. This item includes utilities, repairs 
and maintenance, property taxes and insurance. 
7. Special Costs includes special assessments and/or off-site costs 
such as hook-up charges, etc. 
8. Administrative Costs includes any administrative costs not inclu8ed 
under Development Costs, such as travel costs, courier costs, long-
distance telephone charges, etc. 
9. Profit is based on 12% of Total Cost before Casual Revenue. This 
profit goes to the developer if he is not an equity participant in 
the project. 
10. Marketing Costs are based on 2.25 times one month's rent at 5% vacancy 
for the residential, parking, and laundry component, plus 15% of the 
annual commercial rent. 
ll. Financing Costs include an Application Fee of $100 per unit for the 
first 50 units and $50 per unit thereafter (i.e., $7500 for the 100 
units proposed for this project) plus an Insurance Fee on the permanent 
mortgage of 3~% of the mortgage amount, plus interest payments on the 
mortgage advanced which is here assumed to be advanced over a 12-month 
period and to carry an interest rate of 12~% on a 35 year term. 
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12. Casual Revenue includes the revenue which will be received during 
the first ten months at 50% occupancy for both the residential 
and commercial components. 
Notes to Firestone Site - Operating Budget 
l. Revenue and Expenses projected to increase by 6% annually for 
both commercial and residential operations. 
2. Debt Service assumes a first mortgage of $2,629,866 at 12~% 
amortized over 35 years. 
3. Net revenue distribution assumed to be as follows: 
a) Private investors assumed to earn 10% return on their 
equity ($2,629,866) prior to any payment to the non-
profit corporation. 
b) Non-profit corporation to receive residual revenue up to 
10% of government loan after payment to private investors; 
non-profit corporation to return such revenues to funding 
government in repayment of loan. 
c) Private investors and non-profit corporation to share 
any additional project revenue over and above the payments 
indicated in a) and b) above, on a 50/50 basis. 
d) Sale proceeds (not shown) if any, to be shared by the 
private investors and the non-profit corporation, with 
repayment of private investors taking precedence. 
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Table 13 
Firestone Site - Preliminary Development Budget 
100 apartments 
12000 sq. ft. commercial floor space 
Hard Costs 
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Table 14 
Firestone Site - Total Cost Calculation 
TC = Total Cost 
FC = Fixed Cost 
Land 
Construction 
Development Overhead .05TC 
Technical Fees 
Legal and Accounting 
Operating Costs 
Special Costs 
Administrative Costs 
Profit 
Marketing Costs 
Financing Costs 
. 12TC 
Permanent Loan 7500+(.035)(.25TC) 
Interest (.125)(l 2) (. 2STC) 12 
Casual Revenue 
Fixed Cost 
$ 350,000 
7,659,000 
370,000 
20,000 
116 ,388 
20,000 
5,000 
169,988 
8,710,376 
(407,500) 
8,302,876 
TC = FC + .05TC + .12TC + 7500 +(.035)(.25TC)+(.l25) (12) (.25TC) 
-12 
TC = $8,302,876 + .17TC + $7500 + .00875TC + .03125TC 
TC = $8,310,375 + .21TC 
.79TC = $8,310,376 
TC = $8,310,376 
.79 
$10,519,463 
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Tab 1 e 1 5 
Firestone Site - Development Schedule 
Construction Schedule 
Lease-up Schedule 
First Mortgage Advances 
14 months 
10 months including a two-month overlap 
with the last two months of construction 
To begin four months prior to completion 
and assumed to be fully advanced at 
completion. 
Time between date of first advance and 
full occupancy assumed to be 12 months. 
Tab 1 e 16 
Fires tone Site Project Capitalization 
Total Cost 
First mortgage 
Government Loan 
Private Equity 
$10,519,463 
2,629,866 
5,259,731 
2,629,866 
@ 12.5% for 35 years. 
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Tab 1 e 17 
Firestone Site - Revenue/Expense Analysis 
Base Year 1986 
Revenue - Apartments 
Studios 10 @$520/mo = 520xl2xl0 = $62,400 
One-bed 65 @ 620/mo = 620xl2x65 = 483,600 
Two-bed 25 @ 700/mo = 700xl2x25 = 210,000 
Parking 100 stalls @ $50/stall/mo = 50xl2xl00 
Laundry @ $10/mo/unit = 10xl2xl00 
Expenses 
Operating Expenses 
100 units @ $200/unit 
Gross Revenue 
Less 5% Vacancy 
Effective Revenue 
Management Fee @ 5% of Effective Revenue 
Total Expenses 
Revenue before debt service (residential) 
Plus revenue from commercial 
Gross revenue before debt service 
Debt Service 
Net Revenue 
$ 
$ 
Annual Revenue 
756,000 
60,000 
12,000 
828,000 
41 ,400 
786,600 
240,000 
39,330 
279,330 
507,270 
142,500 
649,770 
325,000 
$ 324,770 
. .,..f .. ~'"..,. 
Table 18 
Fires tone Site - Operating Budget ( $000 IS) 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Revenue (l) *Base Year 
Residential 
Gross Revenue 828 878 930 986 1045 1108 1175 1245 1320 1399 1483 1572 1666 1766 1872 
Less Vacancy @ 5% 41 44 47 49 52 55 59 62 66 70 74 79 83 88 94 
Effective Revenue 787 834 884 937 993 1053 1116 1183 1254 1329 1409 1493 1583 1678 1778 
Commercial 
Gross Revenue 150 159 169 179 189 201 213 226 239 253 269 285 302 320 339 
Less Vacancy @ 5% 8 8 8 9 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 15 16 17 
Effective Revenue 143 151 160 170 180 191 202 214 227 241 255 271 287 304 322 
Total Revenue 930 985 1044 1107 1173 1244 1318 1397 1481 1570 1664 1764 1870 1982 2110 
Expenses (l) 
Operating 240 254 270 286 303 321 340 361 383 405 430 456 483 512 543 
Management Fee (Res.) 39 42 44 47 50 53 56 59 63 66 70 75 79 84 89 
. Tota 1 Expenses 279 296 314 333 353 374 396 420 445 472 500 530 562 596 632 
Revenue Before Debt Service 651 689 730 774 820 870 922 977 1036 1098 1164 1234 1308 1386 1478 CJ) N 
Debt Service (2) 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Net Revenue 364 405 449 495 545 597 652 711 773 839 909 983 1061 1153 
Distribution of Net Revenue (3) 
To Private Investors: 
10% return on $2,629,866; 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 
50% of residual after payment 25 60 97 136 182 to no~-profit corporation 
To Non-Profit Corporation: 101 142 186 232 282 334 389 448 510 526 526 526 526 526 
10% return on $5,259,731 
(if available); 
50% of residual 25 60 97 ~ 182, 
point of recovery 
* The calculations for the Base Year 1986 have not been carried to completion of government loan of 
because the construction period for the rroject has been assumed to be l~ $5,260,000 
months, and at the time of this writing it is already 1985, and accordingly 
1986 cannot constitute a full year of operation. The calculations for 1986 
could have been made on the basis of say a half-year of operation but it was 
felt that a better base for projection would be provided by the full-year 
figures, carried to the point shown here. 
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2.3 Testing the Organizational Component 
The preceding section dealt with the financial component of the 
model. The other basic component is the organizational component, of 
which the locally-based non-profit development corporation is the key 
element. As indicated earlier in this report, the model is being 
examined with reference to two sectors of the core area - the Historic 
Winnipeg area, and the triangl~ of land contained between Ellice Avenue, 
Notre Dame Avenue, and Balmoral Street. Currently, both of these 
sectors have local organizations which could serve as the basis for the 
non-profit development corporations contemplated in the model, although 
in their present form and function they could not perform that role. 
Both would have to be substantially changed in order to transform them 
into a suitable organization, or, alternatively, entirely new and dif-
ferent corporations would have to be created which could draw upon the 
membership, resources, and experience of the present organizations to 
make the establishment of the new corporations much simpler than might 
otherwise be the case. 
The organizations which are now in place are the Old Market Square 
Association in the Historic Winnipeg area, and the Central Park/North 
of Portage Neighbourhood Council in the Ellice/Notre Oame/Balmoral area. 
Meetings and interviews were held with members of both of these organiza-
tions in an attempt to explore the feasiblilty of creating the non-profit 
development corporation in accordance with the basic concept. These 
discussions indicated that in both cases the prospects for creating the 
appropriate organization were not merely feasible but extremely promising. 
In both cases the organizations were receptive to the idea and clearly 
indicated that if the political and financial pieces could be put in place, 
the non-profit development corporation could become a reality. 
This circumstance is of particular interest because of the great 
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differences between the two organizations. The Central Park organiza-
tion was created largely at the initiative of the Core Area Initiative 
bureaucracy and in order to provide 
would participate in the process of 
Initiative for this neighbourhood. 
a citizens organization which 
carrying out the programs of the 
The Old Market Square Association 
was created entirely through the initiative of local businessmen 
and property owners in the Historic Winnipeg Area to develop its 
commercial potential. The histories of these two organizations have 
been vastly different and they have arrived at their present positions 
by entirely different routes. But each is now very interested in the 
idea of a non-profit development corporation as contemplated in the 
model under discussion, and is prepared to undertake the job of bring-
ing such a corporation into being in their respective areas if the 
other elements of the scheme can be committed. A brief overview of 
these two organizations will help to illuminate the organizational 
aspect of the model under examination. 
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2.3. 1 The Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood Council 
Reference has already been made to the three Sectors comprising 
13 Programs which constituted the framework for the Core Area Initiative's 
objectives and activities when it was established. Among these was 
Program 7 which identified the area north of Portage Avenue as one in 
which redevelopment would be carried out, and also Program 11 which 
stated that a Core Area Initiative office would be established in order, 
among other things, to provide a process of consultation with core area 
residents and organizations. 
In pursuit of these objectives the Initiative office was instru-
mental in arranging a public meeting on September 23, 1982, in the Notre 
Dame Senior Citizens Centre at 444 Kennedy Street in order to discuss 
the Core Area Initiative's proposals for the neighbourhood and to explore 
the possibility of setting up a neighbourhood organization to partici-
pate in the program. A follow-up meeting was held on October 20, 1982, 
attended by three local people and two Core Area Initiative officials 
specifically to pursue the idea of a neighbourhood organization and the 
means of providing it with funds. 
As a result of these meetings and the interest they generated, an 
organization began to emerge. On December 2, 1983, an application was 
made to the federal government for funds in the amount of $101,450 on 
behalf of the Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood Council; and 
on December 17, 1982, a letter was sent to the General Manager of the 
Core Area Initiative, signed by two names which represented the nascent 
organization. The letter set out three objectives which the group had 
adopted: 
l. To provide a way for people in the area to improve 
the neighbourhood. 
2. To provide employment opportunities. 
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3. To deal with the impact of the Core Area plan on 
the neighbourhood. 
The letter also asked if the Firestone Building, which had been 
expropriated by the Core Area Initiative in 1981 could be used as the 
office of the organization, which called itself the Central Park/North 
of Portage Neighbourhood Council, but was not as yet legally incorpora-
ted. Approval was given to the group to use the Firestone Building as 
its office, and on January 26, 1983, the Central Park/North of Portage 
Neighbourhood Council was formally incorporated under the Corporations 
Act as a corporation without share capital. Its undertakings, under 
the Articles of Incorporation were restricted to the following: 
To provide a way for people in the neighbourhood to 
improve the area; to develop and maintain a neigh-
bourhood council in the Central Park/North of Portage 
Area which will provide a mechanism for area residents 
to become involved in their community and provide an 
employment opportunities and a resource centre for 
residents of the community. 10 
On February 7, 1983, the organization received a Canada Community 
Development Project grant in the amount applied for in December. The 
grant was for one year, and on February 14, 1983, the Central Park/North 
of Portage Neighbourhood Council Inc. formally opened its doors for 
business. 
One of the first undertakings of the Council was to conduct a survey 
of over 400 residents of the area with the help of the Social Planning 
Council of Canada, to try to establish a "profile" of the neighbourhood -
10 Certificate of Incorporation, Central Park/North of Portage Neighbour-
hood Council Inc. January 26, 1983. 
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its likes and dislikes, hopes and fears, perferences and expectations, 
etc. The results of the survey were announced at a public meeting on 
June 9, 1983. There was only a 59% response to the survey, which is 
too small for absolute confidence in the results. The survey found that 
given a choice between more park, more housing, or more business for 
their neighbourhood, 41% of the respondents chose more park, 31% chose 
more housing and 19% chose more business. The remainder of the respon-
dents either had no preferences, or simply did not answer the question. 
When the preferences were broken down by age, the order of pre-
ference remained the same for respondents between the ages of 18-28, with 
43% choosing more park, 23% choosing more housing, and 26% choosing more 
business. Respondents between the ages of 29-39 had the same order of 
preference, with a higher percentage (55% compared to 43%) choosing more 
park. Respondents over the age of 65 chose more housing as their first 
preference (48%) and more park as their second choice (20%). In all age 
groups more business was a third choice. In general, the order of 
preference indicated by the survey was for more parks, housing, safety, 
general environmental improvement, and business. 
Following the survey, the Council embarked on the preparation of a 
general development plan for the area. They engaged the services of a 
consultant in a series of three contracts which ran for varying lengths 
of time. The plan was presented to a public meeting on December 14, 1983. 
It was received as presented, but there was no formal motion of acceptance 
or approval of the plan. 
At about this time the proposal to develop the old St. Paul •s College 
site as a National Research Council research laboratory was becoming a 
matter of public debate, and the Neighbourhood Council grew concerned that 
the recreational use of that site for which they had hoped might be lost. 
They lobbied the authorities to set aside some part of the St. Paul •s site 
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as a tot-lot, and as a result of their efforts it was agreed that a 
portion of the property would be designated for public recreation use. 
Sometime in the Fall of 1983 the Council began to experience 
difficulties of an internal political nature. It is a curious circum-
stance, but the Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood Council Inc. 
had no real body of general membership; its membership comprised only 
the members of the Board, which varied in number and from time to time 
between six and ten members, not all of whom were residents of the 
neighbourhood. The Board was sharply divided on several issues, but 
the most serious division was over the question of the choice between 
parks and housing as the top priority for neighbourhood development. 
Although the results of the survey announced in June 1983 did not 
demonstrate a preference for housing among the residents of the neigh-
bourhood, there emerged nevertheless a faction on the Board which 
considered housing the top priority. The differences on this issue 
became exacerbated and extended to other aspects of the Council •s 
activities and functions. Two resignations from the Council in early 
1984 were the direct result of the growing and overt factional struggle. 
A further curious circumstance lies in the fact that an employee of the 
Council engaged by the Board as a Project Worker was also an elected 
member of the Board. The internal political struggle becomes even more 
curious in light of the fact that the Core Area Initiative Office was 
heavily involved in this struggle as a partisan favouring the pro-
housing faction, and in November 1983, issued a call for proposals for 
a housing project on a site on the east side of Edmonton Street, between 
Ellice and Qu•Appelle- the site known as the Firestone Site, on which 
the building used by the Council as its office, is located. The circum-
stances surrounding this proposal call have already been reviewed in the 
preceding section dealing with the Shortcomings of Present Financial System 
of the model. 
The Core Area Initiative had a legitimate concern for the succussful 
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functioning of the Neighbourhood Council - it was part of their method 
of operation. When it became evident that the Board was not functioning 
to their satisfaction, early in 1984 the Core Area Initiative office 
asked the Community Education and Development Association of Winnipeg Inc. 
to help restructure the Council and straighten out their difficulties. 
A meeting was held between the CEDA and a subcommittee of the Council, 
out of which came a set of recommendations for improving the operations 
of the Neighbourhood Council. Among these was the recommendation that 
greater participation in the Council should be encouraged among the 
residents of the neighbourhood, and that the composition of the Board 
should be more formally structured to provide representation from specific 
categories of membership such as seniors, public housing tenants, owner-
occupied housing, social agencies, significant ethnic groups, businessmen, 
etc. However, the Council finally decided that membership on the Board 
should be by election-at-large. 
The Canada Community Development Project grant which the Council had 
received on February 7, 1983, and on which they had been operating, was 
only for a one year period. In fact, it had been exhausted by January 
1984, and formally expired on February 7, 1984. Because there was no more 
money available, the office had been closed in January and had remained 
closed until April. It was able to reopen in that month because a grant 
was received from the Core Area Initiative and the Council resumed its 
activities on April 2, 1984. 
On May 29, 1984, an annual general meeting of the Council was held. 
The meeting was attended by about 100 people. There were 29 candidates 
who stood for election to the 20 places to be filled on the Board. Of the 
29 candidates, 19 were local residents, all of whom were elected. They 
included three businessmen and 16 residents. The 20th member elected to 
the Board was a non-resident. The turn-out for this meeting, and the 
virtually total resident composition of the Board which was elected, seemed 
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to bode a new interest and vitality in the organization. However, at the 
end of June the Treasurer absconded with $1867.68 of the Council's funds. 
This set off another wave of hostilities and recriminations, both inter-
nally, and between the Board and the Core Area Initiative office. In 
September the Board voted to dismiss the two Project Workers, and on the 
17th of that month a meeting was held between the Board and officials of 
the Core Area Initiative at which the competence of the Board was again 
reviewed and the future of the Council questioned. Since then the Board 
has been trying to pick up the pieces and patch up the serious cracks in 
their organization. 
The funding which had been provided to the Council in April 1984 by 
the Core Area Initiative was for a six month period which ended on October 
2, 1984. Since then the Council has been trying to operate without a 
funding commitment. Whether it will continue to function, and on what 
basis, has yet to be determined. However, they are proceeding on the 
assumption that they will continue and are extremely interested in the 
idea of a non-profit development corporation for their neighbourhood. 
They have recently (November 1984) published a report called "Housing 
Strategy for the North Portage Triangle" which sets out their position 
on housing for their neighbourhood. It is a well thought-out and ,presented 
set of policies for the development of the area. 
Discussions with the Board, and interviews with some of its members 
indicate that they recognize the shortcomings and failings of the Council. 
However, they also indicate that they recognize a number of specific reasons 
for these shortcomings and failings. One of the most important reasons 
they identify is, the lack of organizational experience and political skills 
among the members of the Board, which allowed, for example, an employee of 
the Council to sit as an elected member of the Board and assume an important 
role in influencing the Board's policies. Another reason they identify is 
the lack of long-term and adequate commitment of funds to the Council. 
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Still another, and perhaps critical, reason is the difference between the 
Core Area Initiative officials and the residents of the neighbourhood in 
the way in which they viewed the neighbourhood and the policies which they 
thought should be pursued for its development. Because the Core Area 
office had the bureaucratic power, (for example, no employee could be 
hired by the Board, without approval of the Core Area Initiative office), 
and controlled the funds for the Council, and because the Board did not 
always agree with the CAI officials, the Board members felt coerced and 
completely lacking in autonomy, even though it was the development of 
their own neighbourhood which was at issue. 
Reflection on the matter suggests that there may be still another, 
and perhaps even more basic reason for the lack of success of the Council. 
That reason lies at the very foundation of the Council, and is implicit 
in its Articles of Incorporation. A reading of item 5 of those Articles, 
which was quoted earlier in this section, reveals that there were no 
specific roles, responsibilities, or powers which were contemplated for, 
or conferred upon the Council. From this statement of the Articles one 
senses that the role proposed for the Council was a passive one rather 
than an active one; a role of providing the medium for carrying out the 
undertakings and initiatives of others. 
Item 5 of the Articles of Incorporation stated three undertakings 
which defined the limits of the Council 1 S objectives and activities. One 
was 11 tO provide a way for people in the neighbourhood to improve the area 11 ; 
the second was 11 to provide a mechanism for area residents to become in-
volved in their community 11 ; and the third was to 11 provide an employment 
opportunities and a resource centre for residents of the community. 11 It 
will of course be argued that item 5 of the official form of Articles of 
Incorporation are always cast in these very bread general terms, and 
quite deliberately so, in order not to inhibit the more specific and 
detailed terms of reference which will be incorporated in the constitution, 
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bylaws, and activities of the organization as it pursues its corporate 
affairs. 
However, the three purposes set out in item 5 of the Articles do not 
seem to be of that nature: they say nothing about the general purposes 
of the Council and do not delineate any general area of activity, the 
details and specifics of which might be spelled out in subsequent and 
other documents. To say that the reason for establishing the Council is 
"to provide a way for the people in the neighbourhood to improve the area" 
is quite meaningless because the establishment of the Council in itself is 
not a way to improve the neighbourhood, and there is no indication of what 
powers, resources, instruments, etc. the Council can employ to improve the 
neighbourhood. Similarly, the second purpose "to provide a mechanism for 
area residents to become involved in their community" is also spurious, 
since there were already many opportunities for residents to become in-
volved without the need for a Neighbourhood Council; and the third purpose 
to "provide an employment opportunities and a resource centre for residents 
of the community" is perhaps the most misleading and meaningless since the 
issue of employment is probably among the most serious concerns of the 
people of the core area, and there was no provision for the Council to take 
any effective initiative in creating jobs or to have any meaningful involve-
ment in creating job opportunities in the area, except perhaps as an infor-
mation centre, 11 which role was already performed by a variety of federal 
and provincial agencies with that specific responsibility. 
Perhaps it is not merely a coincidence that the language of the Articles 
of Incorporation is virtually identical to the language of the Proposed 
11 Ibid., Article 5. 
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Winnipeg Core Area Initiative June 1981 publication. Throughout that 
latter document, which sets out the Sectors and Programs of the Core 
Area Initiative, there is repeated reference to participation and involve-
ment of the people of the neighbourhood in the programs which the 
Initiative will undertake and be responsible for in the neighbourhood 
areas. For example, on Page 7, under C. STRATEGY, the following state-
ment is made in subparagraph (c) of the first paragraph: 11 (c) to 
facilitate the effective social and economic participation of core area 
residents in development opportunities." 
On Page 10, under Program 3: Community Improvement Areas, the 
following statement appears: 
The Community Improvement Areas Program will improve 
the physical environment of designated neighbourhoods 
by providing new parks, recreation facilities, infra-
structure, and streetscaping, planned in consultation 
with neighbourhood advisory bodies.l2 
Again on Page 10 under the heading Program 4: Community Facilities, 
the following statement appears: 
The objective of this program is to provide financial 
contributions towards the capital costs of new or 
expanded community facilities to foster the participa-
tion of core area residents in social, cultural, and 
economic development opportunities.l3 
And on the same page, under Program 5: Community Services, the 
document speaks in the same language about financial contributions 
12 
13 
Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Policy Committee - Proposed Winnipeg 
Core Area Initiative June 1981, Program 3: Community Improvement 
Areas, p. 10. 
Ibid., Program 4: Community Facilities, p. 10. 
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towards community services: 
to facilitate the participation of core area residents 
in social, cultural, and economic development opportuni-
ties, 14 
and of creating a community-based foundation 
to advise on the provision of funds, ... to facilitate 
the participation of core area residents in social, 
cultural, and economic development opportunities on 
a continuing basis.l5 
On Page 13 under Program 11: Management and Consultation, the 
following statement is made: 
The objective of this program is to provide for the 
overall management of programs and projects implemented 
under the Agreement. A Core Area Initiative office 
will be established to manage the Agreement; to provide 
a process of consultation with core area residents, 
organizations, and the community; and to prepare such 
plans and studies as are reqy~red to achieve the 
objectives of the Agreement. 
On Page 14 under Program 12: Public Information: 
·"·Both general and specific information on Agreement 
programs will be prepared and disseminated in a 
comprehensive manner designed to encourage greater 
participation by core area residents and specific 17 interest groups and to reach a large general audience. 
Clearly, in order that the Core Area Initiative carry out its role 
in conformity with the statements in the publication of June 1981, it 
was necessary that it have local community organizations which could 
14 Ibid., Program 5: Community Services, l o. p. 
15 Ibid., Program 5: Community Services, p. 10. 
16 Ibid., Program 11: Management and Consultation, p. 13. 
17 Ibid., Program 12: Public Information, p. 14. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·------
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directly receive its communications and directives and which would also 
be seen as evidence that the objectives of the Initiative, in terms of 
local participation, were being pursued. 
It must be acknowledged that during its relatively short and stress-
ful history, the Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood Council did 
in fact undertake a number of activities at its own initiative. For 
example, in the Fall of 1983 it presented a brief on its safety concerns 
to the City Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee; it started several 
Neighbourhood Watch programs on various occasions (none of which was 
successful); it undertook the publication of a monthly newsletter, with 
moderate success; it worked on a co-op housing project which is still 
in abeyance awaiting government approval; it lobbied for more recreation 
facilities and green space, again with moderate success; it held various 
block parties, Xmas parties; and outings for the poor, etc. all of which 
were regarded as successful. 
However, in spite of these internally generated activities, it is 
clear that the Council was created as an instrument to carry out the 
policies and programs of the Core Area Initiative. As indicated earlier, 
the language of the Articles of Incorporation of the Central Park/North 
of Portage Neighbourhood Council and of the Proposed Winnipeg Core Area 
Initiative document of June 1981 is strikingly similar in the phrasing 
of their respective objectives and suggests that the Initiative officials 
had a dominant role in creating the Council and in drafting the Articles 
of its Incorporation. And the history of the Council indicates that it 
was created specifically to serve the purposes of the Initiative. The 
history of the Council also indicates how hazardous is the attempt to use 
local residents groups as the instrument to carry out policies and 
programs which are conceived and articulated by a central bureaucracy. 
The practice is probably inevitably doomed to failure. 
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In these circumstances it is understandable why the Central Park/ 
North of Portage Neighbourhood Council is unhappy about its relationship 
to the Core Area Initiative office, and why it is so receptive to the 
idea of becoming a non-profit development corporation with a greater 
measure of autonomy. 
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2.3.2 The Old Market Square Association 
In contrast to the Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood 
Council, which was essentially the creation of a government bureaucracy 
to serve the purposes of a centrally conceived and administered renewal 
program, the Old Market Square Association was the spontaneous creation 
of a small local group of private individuals - local businessmen, 
property owners, and concerned citizens -who recognized the unique 
qualities of this part of the city and saw in it the potential for a 
different kind of renewal. The examples of Vancouver's Gastown and 
Toronto's Yorkville were still fresh and exciting demonstrations of what 
could be done to revitalize older, historic areas of the city centre, 
and Winnipeg's historic warehouse district was certainly as attractive -
perhaps even 1much more attractive - in terms of its architectural quality 
and historic character than either of those two. It seemed inevitable 
that Winnipeg's heritage, now lying dormant and underutilized, was 
destined for a renaissance which would infuse into these old warehouse 
loft buildings a wide variety of new and flourishing activities and 
would transform the area into a charming and vital local centre of con-
temporary city life. 
There had been stirrings of renewal in the area as early as the end 
of the 1960s and early 1970s. For example, the Old Spaghetti Factory 
dates from about that time. Kay's Manufacturing moved into the old Stovel 
Building which had previously housed a printing establishment, and carried 
out some clean-up and renovation of the premises. The Maltese Cross 
Building too had undergone some improvements. And there are others. But 
it was in the mid-1970s that activity became intensified. 
Throughout the winter of 1976 and the spring of 1977, a series of 
meetings was held to explore the prospects for such a renewal, and the 
means by which it might be accomplished. Through these meetings it was 
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learned that in the city 1s Department of Environmental Planning there was 
an active interest in improving the area, and that the City Council was 
sympathetic. At that time precise concepts of the form which improvement 
might take had not been formulated, but thoughts had been stimulated, and 
ideas were beginning to take shape. One idea was that a plan and sketches 
should be prepared illustrating the way in which the area might be developed. 
It was felt such a presentation would help people to visualize what was 
proposed, stimulate their imagination and enthusiasm, and muster support 
for the concept. Accordingly, the preparation of a plan and sketches was 
commissioned, and financed by this ad hoc group. Some years earlier-
about 1974 - the City of Winnipeg 1 S Planning Department had created a 
series of sketches showing how the area could be physically and visually 
improved, and these sketches provided the basis for the new illustrations 
which were prepared by local architects, planners, and designers. 
However, it was recognized that sketches alone would not attract new 
business, private investment, and public funds into the area, all of which 
were necessary if the concept of renewal was to become a reality. It was 
felt that at that time, two hard, specific measures were necessary. One 
of these was to create a focal point which would draw people into the area 
and expose them to the unique buildings, the safe and attractive surround-
ings, and the potential for new business development. A Farmer 1 S Market 
was thought to be the ideal vehicle for this measure. The park area where 
the market is now held was thought to be the ideal space, and negotiations 
were entered into with the City to lease the land for that purpose. The 
other measure which was felt to be necessary was to create a formal organi-
zation which could speak for the area as a whole, formulate policies and 
carry out programs, receive funds and grants, and act as the contracting 
body in the matter of leasing the land and conducting the operations for 
the market. 
Such an organization was formed and was incorporated as the Old Market 
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Square Association on October 28, 1977. No full or part-time staff were 
employed by the Old Market Square Association. In that circumstance it 
would have been difficult if not indeed impossible for the organization 
to have made any progress in the pursuit of its objectives, had it not 
been for the assistance of the City 1 S Department of Environmental Planning, 
and in particular of two of its members - Mr. Chuck Brook and Mr. Steve 
Barber. The hundreds of hours of time provided by them and a small 
support staff enabled the Old Market Square Association to develop into 
a strong community-based organization which was recognized as representing 
the interests of the people in the Historic Winnipeg area in matters of 
planning and development, and could assist formally in the operation of 
the summer market. One of the first actions of the Old Market Square 
Association after its incorporation was its undertaking to raise and spend 
$60,000 over 12 years for the development of the market. 
The summer market ran successfully for two years, 1978 and 1979, with 
some beneficial spin-offs. Several buildings in the area changed hands, 
and improvements were being carried out by private owners. Trend Interiors, 
Modernage Furniture, and Townsite all were renovated. Difficulties, 
however, began to emerge. The City 1 s Health Department, for example, was 
becoming concerned about the preparation of food and the sale of produce 
which was being conducted on an improvised, ad hoc basis. The total lack 
of hygienic facilities was no longer acceptable. Moreover, the market was 
turning into a flea market rather than the farmers market which had origi-
nally been concei.ved. It was obvious that improvements were necessary; 
a better facility was required both for the safety of the public and to 
encourage a better type of vendor. 
The organization lobbied City Council to make some improvements in the 
park, and to develop a streetscaping plan for the area. Major street 
improvements were carried out in the form of attractive paving, planting, 
and street furniture, and there was some minor up-grading of the park/market 
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area. This work extended over a two to three year period and to date is 
continuing. There has been a marked success in the effort to improve the 
general appearance and environmental quality of the streets in the area, 
but the issue of the market has not been resolved. 
One of the forces which contributed to the heightening of interest in 
the Historic Winnipeg area in the mid-l970s was the activity of Heritage 
Canada. Interest in heritage preservation was mounting throughout the 
country at this time, and in 1976 Heritage Canada embarked on a program to 
interest all cities in adopting measures to preserve their historic 
buildings and places. A number of studies were undertaken in various 
cities across the land. The Manitoba Historical Society carried out the 
study in Winnipeg, and in May 1976 produced its report entitled "Winnipeg's 
Historic Warehouse Area.'' Arising out of this work was a proposal by 
Heritage Canada for a tripartite approach to the preservation and rehabili-
tation of the Historic Warehouse Area, under which Heritage Canada and the 
provincial and city governments would each contribute $500,000 to such a 
restoration and revitalization program. 
The City's contribution was to take the form of streetscaping; the 
delineation of a Historic Winnipeg zoning district in the city's zoning 
bylaw, with regulations designed to carry out the program's objectives; 
the creation of the Historic Winnipeg Advisory Committee, and the Historic 
Buildings Committee to advise on matters affecting the conservation of 
the heritage of the area and on the creation and expansion of a list of 
historic buildings to which special regulations would apply in order to 
ensure their preservation as part of the public heritage. 
The contribution of Heritage Canada under this scheme was to take the 
form of the renovation of a historic building as a demonstration of what 
could be accomplished in practical terms to recycle a heritage structure. 
The Hammond Building on Albert Street was selected for this project~ and 
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the renovation was carried out. It is of passing interest to note that 
the building, renovated as an office building, is a financial failure 
and Heritage Canada is seeking to dispose of it. 
The form which the Government of Manitoba 1 s contribution was to take 
was indeterminate. The provincial authorities were uncertain as to the 
best course for them to follow. Typical of such circumstances, in 1977 
they struck a committee to study the matter and come up with a recommenda-
tion. The committee was under the chairmanship of the provincial assistant 
deputy minister in charge of cultural affairs, and its members were repre-
sentatives of the City, the Manitoba Historical Society, and the Old Market 
Square Association. 
After a series of committee meetings the notion emerged among its 
members that the provincial contribution could best be handled through 
a trust fund which would then distribute monies to various deserving 
applicants. But such an arrangement would require a board of trustees 
to administer the fund. This board, moreover, would have other important 
responsibilities and characteristics. For example, it would have to have 
a central concern for the public interest; it would have to identify 
buildings worthy of preservation; it would have to do research in the 
heritage field; and it would have to develop conservation information and 
techniques. All of these roles and responsibilities were quite different 
and remote from those of the businessmen in the area. Clearly the Old 
Market Square Association with its businessmen membership and its business 
goals could not function as the managers of the trust. Accordingly, in 
1978, Heritage Winnipeg was incorporated as the body to perform that role. 
The membership of the Heritage Winnipeg corporation comprised three 
city councillors, three representatives of the Old Market Square Associa-
tion, one representative of the Manitoba Historical Society, one from 
Parks Canada, one from Heritage Canada, three from the provincial government 
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(Tourism, Historic Resources, Government Services) and three members at 
large. In spite of this impressive and responsible membership, and in 
spite of having been incorporated in 1978, Heritage Winnipeg received no 
funds from the provincial government until the Fall of 1980. Between 
1978 and 1980, all expenditures by Heritage Winnipeg were handled directly 
by the department of Historic Resources of the province. 
In the first year of its existence, expenditures on the Heritage 
Winnipeg account amounted to only $39,000 although the province's parti-
cipation in the scheme h~d been on the basis of a commitment of $100,000 
per year for five years. The unexpended balance of $61,000 was lost to 
the corporation because the province decided, seemingly retro-actively 
that unexpended monies could not be carried over into subsequent budget 
years. 
In 1980 the provincial government moved to devolve the budgetary 
responsibility for the heritage program onto Heritage Winnipeg. A 
provincial election in 1981 brought about a change in government, with 
the NDP coming to power. This meant a delay while the new government 
put its own policies and programs in place, and Heritage Winnipeg received 
no funds until 1982. 
In October, 1980 the Policy Committee of the Core Area Initiative 
published a request for public submissions on the Winnipeg Core Area 
Initiative as proposed in the Memorandum of Understanding which had been 
signed by the three governments in the preceding month. This request 
referred to all proposals of the Initiative including Program 9: Historic 
Winnipeg Area Development. The Old Market Square Association responded 
to this call with a submission which set out the views of the members of 
that organization who were in the main small businessmen and property 
owners. Whatever may have been the Policy Committee's re~ction to their 
submission, the Old Market Square Association's proposal did not form a 
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specific component of the subsequent activities of the Initiative in the 
area. 
Heritage Winnipeg was similarly disappointed. When the Core Area 
Initiative was established, Heritage ~linnipeg assumed that they would be 
given some responsibility in administering the budget of over $5 million 
for Program 9 which covered the 13 blocks of the Historic Winnipeg Area. 
Neither the Old Market Square Associat~on nor Heritage Winnipeg were 
given any responsibility nor any funds for activities under Program 9 of 
the Initiative. The only monies received by Heritage Winnipeg from the 
Initiative office was a sum of about $4000 to cover the cost of publishing 
a brochure, prepared by Heritage Winnipeg, and called The Historic Winnipeg 
Restoration Area: An Illustrated Guide to Winnipeg's Historic Warehouse 
District, which incidentally, the brochure states is a Core Area Initiative 
publication, and for which the Initiative has taken all the credit. Heri-
tage Winnipeg has operated entirely on funds provided by the Province of 
Manitoba out of the $500,000 commitment it had made in 1976. Since that 
time, however, Heritage Winnipeg has only received a total of about 
$350,000 and the province in 1983 abrogated its commitment, so that there 
are now no funds available. 
The Old Market Square Association has received no monies from the 
Core Area Initiative. In fact, it has received virtually no funds from 
any source other than Heritage Winnipeg. Whatever support the Association 
has received has come from that source. The Old Market Square Association 
has always had representation on the Board of Heritage Winnip~g. This 
relationship made it possible for Heritage Winnipeg to share some of the 
Old Market Square Association's operating costs. Since 1980 Heritage 
Winnipeg has put between $10,000 and $15,000 per year into the Old Market 
Square Association, and in 1982 the two organizations formally agreed to 
share Heritage Winnipeg's office and staff, and the promotion of area events 
on a cost-shared basis. However, because the Old Market Square Association 
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has no outside sources of funds, Heritage Winnipeg during the two year 
period 1982-1983, has had to put up about $30,000 to cover the Old Market 
Square Association's share of the cost. 
It is probably true that the Old Market Square Association is coming 
to the end of its existence in its present form. It is continuing to 
function but with declining energy and effectiveness. It continues to 
operate the summer market, but only on a temporary basis. Clearly, without 
assured funding the organization cannot continue, and without a large 
capital injection, the market cannot be brought to a healthy and vigorous 
level of operation. It was considered in some circles of government and 
among some members of the Association, that perhaps a year-round market, 
properly capitalized and operated, might provide the ?Park needed to 
inspire new vitality into the area. Accordingly a study of the feasibility 
of such a project was commissioned by the Core Area Initiative. The find-
ings, at the time of this writing, have not yet been made public, but the 
general impression is that they are not very encouraging. If the study 
indicates that a year-round farmers market in the Historic Winnipeg Area 
is only marginally feasible, then there is little prospect for the continua-
tion of the Old Market Square Association. 
Because of its financial circumstances, and because of the declining 
vitality of the market upon which the hopes of the Old Market Squane Associa-
tion had originally been built, there has recently been a marked falling-
off of interest among the Association's members. There is a prevailing 
feeling among them that quicker, less costly, and more effective community-
based projects and action could have been achieved had the funding mechan~ 
ism directly supported the Old Market Square Association rather than build-
ing up layers of bureaucratic infrastructure, which has tended to weaken 
the role of the Association and frustrate its members, leading to apathy 
and the ultimate demise of the organization. 
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There is also now emerging a divergence of interest among the members. 
Some of them feel that what is needed is a more vigorous promotion of the 
commercial side of the area - business, retailing, restaurants, etc. The 
interest of some, however, is now turning to housing and the possibility 
of recycling" the old warehouse structures for housing and mixed housing and 
commercial use. Some still favour the idea of an expanded and revitalized 
market. Some are concerned about a general development plan which would 
provide a set of specific development guidelines. 
During the seven years of its existence, the Old Market Square Associa-
tion, in spite of the fact that it has never been adequately funded, or 
properly involved in development decisions affecting the Historic Winnipeg 
Area, has performed an important function. As a group representing the 
property owners and businessmen of the area, it has presented that view 
with a unified voice to the various levels of government and the Core Area 
Initiative. They have been successful in influencing decisions on up-
grading and improving the general quality of the environment in their area. 
However, without assurance of adequate funding and full-time staff to 
assist the volunteer board, the organization in its present form probably 
has no future. 
Discussions with its members have indicated an interest among some of 
them, in the idea of a non-profit development corporation as proposed in 
the model here being examined, and it is entirely likely that if events 
were to arrive at the point where the other various components of the 
model were ready to be put in place, the Old Market Square Association, 
or some part of it, would readily be converted into the appropriate non-
profit development corporation under discussion in this study. 
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3.0 CONCLUSIONS 
3.1 Feasibility of the Model 
This study set out to develop a model which would stimulate core 
area revitalization through the provision of a substantially increased 
volume of new economic rental housing in the core area. In order to 
provide this increased housing, defects in the present system which 
inhibit the development of such housing would have to be overcome. 
These defects are inherent in the present means of financing rental 
housing construction, and in the present organization of the system for 
delivering the product. If these defects are to be overcome, and a new 
arrangement put in place, which would be a more effective instrument 
for achieving the housing objective and through it the revitalization 
objective, then one of the basic requirements is to develop a theoreti-
cal model which seems to overcome the present difficulties and holds 
promise for a significant improvement in the production of housing. This 
study has developed such a model, and has tested its major aspects - the 
financial and the organizational - and found them to be feasible. 
It is of particular interest to note that the financial analysis 
of the three hypothetical projects indicates that on the basis of the 
assumptions made, the government loan would be repaid (without interest) 
in 14 years for the East of Main site, in 12 years for the Gault Building 
Annex, and in 13 years for the Firestone site. In each of these instances 
the performance of the model in this respect is better than the present 
CRSP program of the federal government in which no repayment whatsoever 
is made during the first 15 years, and the government must wait to recover 
its loan (albeit with interest) for the balance of the amortization period, 
which in the case of a 35 year amortization would take an additional 20 
years beyond the initial 15-year no-payment period. 
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There may be other models which could be formulated and which 
in theory would work just as well as the one which has been developed 
in this study, and would be equally promising as a mechanism for achieving 
an increased volume of housing in the core area. However, it is this 
particular model which has emerged from the present study, not some other 
model, and it is therefore this model which is recommended to the atten-
tion and consideration of the various authorities and agencies and corpora-
tions and individuals whose interest it touches. On the evidence found 
by this study, it may be concluded that the model proposed here is feasible, 
and that it would provide an effective instrument for stimulating the 
production of housing in the core area. If an increased production of 
housing is an essential element in core area revitalization, then it must 
follow that the model developed in this study would be an effective means 
of stimulating that revitalization process. 
The model is of course a theoretical construct, and, as with all 
theoretical models, there must inevitably be discrepancies between the 
idea and its practical implementation. Nevertheless, the three hypotheti-
cal projects analyzed provide a sufficient basis for confidence in the 
financial structure of the model, and the two local organizations investi-
gated indicate the feasibility of establishing the appropriate locally-
based non-profit development corporations. Discussions with developers 
indicate that they have no difficulties with the model and would be 
prepared to co-operate in the way it proposes. It must be recognized 
however that the developers have no particular attachment to the model. 
They have only two fundamental concerns - one is that there be a reliable 
commitment of a sufficiently large financial subvention for a sufficiently 
long and reliable period of time to enable them to embark on development 
projects with confidence; the other is that the amount of bureaucratic 
red-tape be minimal. Given these two assurances, the means of achieving 
them is a matter of indifference to the developers. The model proposed 
here is as acceptable to them as any other which would provide them with 
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the same assurances. The one crucial but unknown element in the entire 
concept is that of the funding government. Without the participation 
of government as a source of the required funds in the form of a loan 
to the non-profit development corporation, the model remains merely 
another one of those many ideas which seem to have a lot to commend them 
but which cannot be implemented and therefore are useless. There are, 
however, a number of considerations which suggest that the situation may 
be more promising. 
First, the Core Area Initiative has already committed $96 million 
to the revitalization programs, and the North Portage Corporation has 
$71 million committed, and although substantial results from these 
expenditures are expected, they have yet to emerge in tangible form. 
But even when these investments begin to bear fruit, it is unlikely that 
in themselves they will be able to generate the area-wide revitalization 
of the core on the scale which had been initially envisioned. There 
will be an ongoing need for follow-up investments, and although it is 
entirely possible that one or more of the governments involved will 
choose not to continue its involvement, it would be regrettable to have 
taken the revitalization effort so far and to have to abandon it at the 
time when additional investment would provide the extra push that is 
necessary to amplify the thrust imparted by the initial program, and 
enable it to infuse the entire core area with the new vitality that most 
Winnipeger's still hope for. 
The support of the three levels of government still seems to be 
committed to the principle of core area revitalization. It is not clear 
at the moment what form that support will take when the present Agreement 
expires. However, if there is to be a renewed financial commitment in a 
form not yet determined, it would be eminently sensible for careful 
consideration to be given to the scheme which has been developed in this 
study. 
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3.2 Potential of the Model for Wider Planning and Development Application 
The impact of such a new instrument for core area revitalization 
on existing instruments such as the Core Area Initiative and the North 
Portage Development Corporation must be taken into consideration in 
assessing the feasibility of this proposed new departure. Dealing with 
the Core Area Initiative first, it seems unlikely that the Initiative 
Agreement will be renewed. In any case, the major role of the CAI has 
been in the area of "soft" services - training, education, community 
organizations etc. These are of course important services, but it can 
be argued that they are addressed to the problems of poverty and should 
be subsumed under a program dealing with the general problem of poverty 
in the city rather than under a core-area revitalization program whose 
funds must of necessity be limited and inadequate to deal effectively 
with the broad spectrum of deep-seated social issues. 
The inclusion of social adjustment measures as part of a core-area 
revitalization effort is theoretically appealing because it recognizes 
the fact that all of the problems of an ailing central area are somehow 
interconnected to a greater or lesser degree, which is of course true. 
But the disadvantage of this approach is that it spreads limited funds 
too thinly over a too-broad area of concerns. The result of such a 
diffusion of resources is that those problems which are rooted in the 
general problem of poverty can only be dealt with superficially and on 
a limited scale. There is also the further danger that the resources 
which remain available for physical and economic infrastructure invest-
ment will be reduced until they are inadequate to carry out an effective 
revitalization program. 
One could argue that the Core Area Initiative is a case in point. 
Whatever the CAI programs may have achieved in the area of life-skills 
and job-skills training, in assisting special needs groups, and in 
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strengthening community-based organizations, they will not solve the 
general problem of poverty, and will not prevent the continuing need for 
special needs programs for those unfortunate individuals who will continue 
to come in behind thbse who have already been served by the CAI programs. 
A core area revitalization program is not the appropriate context 
within which such programs are most effectively pursued. The fact that 
the North Portage Development Corporation had to be established as a 
separate authority from the CAI office, and required additional funding 
for its own budget testifies to the basically different objectives of 
these two types of programs, however they may be interconnected at deeper 
levels. 
This view of the issue leads to the conclusion that if the social 
adjustment programs now comprising the work of the Core Area Initiative 
are to be continued they should not be continued as part of the core 
area revitalization effort but as part of a separate undertaking whose 
mandate is to address the general problem of poverty in the city. 
If the 11 SOft 11 services components were to be subsumed under a 
different, comprehensive, urban-poverty-oriented program, and the core 
area revitalization effort were concentrated on the stimulation of 
investment in the physical and economic development of the central area 
of the city, the non-profit development corporations contemplated in 
this study could provide an appropriate and effective vehicle to succeed 
the present Core Area Initiative and carry the revitalization process 
forward to a successful conclusion. 
As for the North Portage Development Corporation, there should be no 
essential conflict between it and the non-profit corporations contemplated 
in this study. The designated area within which the operations of the 
North Portage Development Corporation are to be conducted is clearly 
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delimited. It is an area of eight or nine acres lying between Ellice 
Avenue and the lane south of and parallel to Portage Avenue, and 
between Edmonton Street and Colony/Balmoral. Within the general concept 
of this study the North Portage Corporation would constitute one of 
several such development corporations, all of which would have a mandate 
to develop a designated area, and all of which,. taken together, are 
necessary if a major surge of new vitality is to be generated in the 
central area of the city. The one question which could be the cause 
of concern is whether the establishment of development corporations in 
other parts of the core area could diminish the significance of the 
North Portage Development Corporation and whether the provision of 
housing in these other areas could jeopardize the market for housing 
in the North Portage site. 
It is possible to over-estimate the magnitude of the threat to 
North Portage on both these counts. There are a number of circumstances 
which would tend to minimize any possible danger. The fact that the 
North Portage Development Corporation is already established and has a 
long head-start over any other corporation which may be established 
gives North Portage a very decided advantage and assures it of first 
call on the market. Another factor is the expectation that as many as 
2,500 dwelling units could be built and occupied in the central area of 
the city over and above the 800 or 1,000 units proposed for the North 
Portage site. The concept developed in this study visualizes that this 
volume of housing could be provided over a ten-year period, so that the 
demand on the market would not be so intense as to deprive any of the 
several sites of development opportunity. Finally it should be recog-
nized that not all of the sites would serve the same market. Potential 
residents who are interested in accommodation in the North Portage 
project are not the same people as those who are interested in the Historic 
Winnipeg area; and these are not the same as those who would constitute 
the market for the South Point Douglas area, who in turn would represent 
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a different market from those who would be interested in the East Yard 
of the CN if it were to become a housing site at some future date. 
During the course of discussions of the model with officials of 
various government agencies and others, some concern was expressed about 
the fact that the model does not provide for any central planning or 
co-ordinating authority which would be able to ensure that the plans of 
the five sectors here proposed would not conflict with each other. 
In response, one might point out that there is no evidence that 
centralized planning authority has been any more effective than the degree 
of decentralization here proposed would be. Given the fact that the 
amount of funding is limited, the time-span is prescribed, the magnitude 
and nature of the program precisely defined, the target markets signifi-
cantly different from each other, and initial funding contingent on the 
funding government's approval of the local proposal, there seems to be 
no need for any role for a central bureaucracy. One might even argue 
that the decentralization contemplated in the model would permit a much 
greater efficiency in the process of planning and implementing the develop-
ment projects. This viewpoint was expressed with strong conviction by 
members of both the Central Park/North of Portage Neighbourhood Council 
and the Old Market Square Association. One may discount the validity of 
these opinions as representing the biases of those with vested interests, 
but the history of both of these organizations and the course of events 
which has been experienced in both of their areas, does not inspire confi-
dence in the proposition that a central authority is necessarily any more 
effective, or indeed even as effective, as a decentralized local responsi-
bility. 
Nevertheless, if the matter of co-ordination remains a pressing concern, 
the model provides the means of addressing that issue. It will be recalled 
that the model proposes that the Board of Directors of each of the local 
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non-profit development corporations be made up of local people as well as 
appointees from the funding government, the Mayor of the City of Winnipeg, 
and the Institute of Urban Studies of the University of Winnipeg. If 
these latter appointees were to constitute a core group with the same 
individuals serving on the Boards of each of the five Corporations, they 
would constitute a linkage which would provide more than sufficient co-
ordination and continuity to satisfy any need for centrality. 
Table 18 
Firestone Site - Operating Budget ($GOO's) 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Revenue (1) *Base Year 
Residential 
Gross Revenue 828 878 930 986 1045 1108 1175 1245 1320 1399 1483 1572 1666 1766 1872 
Less Vacancy @ 5% 41 44 47 49 52 55 59 62 66 70 74 79 83 88 94 
Effective Revenue 787 834 884 937 993 1053 1116 1183 1254 1329 1409 1493 1583 1678 1778 
Commercial 
Gross Revenue 150 159 169 179 189 201 213 226 239 253 269 285 302 320 339 
Less Vacancy @ 5% 8 8 8 9 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 15 16 17 
Effective Revenue 143 151 160 170 180 191 202 214 227 241 255 271 287 304 322 
Total Revenue 930 985 1044 1107 1173 1244 1318 1397 1481 1570 1664 1764 1870 1982 2110 
Expenses (1) 
Operating 240 254 270 286 303 321 340 361 383 405 430 456 483 512 543 
Management Fee (Res.) 39 42 44 47 50 53 56 59 63 66 70 75 79 84 89 
Total Expenses 279 296 314 333 353 374 396 420 445 472 500 530 562 596 632 
Revenue Before Debt Service 651 689 730 774 820 870 922 977 1036 1098 1164 1234 1308 1386 1478 
Debt Service (2) 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 
Net Revenue 364 405 449 495 545 597 652 711 773 839 909 983 1061 1153 
Distribution of Net Revenue (3) 
To Private Investors: 
10% return on $2,629,866; 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 
50% of residual after payment 25 60 97 136 182 to non-profit corporation 
To Non-Profit Corporation: 101 142 186 232 282 334 389 448 510 526 526 526 526 526 
10% return on $5,259,731 
(if available); 
50% of residual 25 60 97 I 136 
" 
182, 
point of recovery 
* The calculations for the Base Year 1986 have not been carried to completion of government loan of 
because the construction period for the project has been assumed to be 14 $5,260,000 
months, and at the time of this writing it is already 1985, and accordin9ly 
1986 cannot constitute a full year of operation. The calculations for 1986 
could have been made on the basis of say a half-year of operation but it was 
felt that a better base for prpjection would be provided by the full-year 
figures, carried to the point shown here. 
Table 12 
Gault Buildin~ Annex - Operating Budget ($GOO's) 
Year 
--
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Revenue (1) 
Residential 
Gross Revenue 150 159 169 179 189 201 213 226 239 253 269 285 302 
Less vacancy @ 5% 8 8 8 9 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 15 
Effective Revenue 143 151 160 170 180 191 202 214 227 241 255 271 287 
Commercial 
Gross Revenue 30 30 30 32 32 32 34 34 34 36 36 36 38 
Less vacancy @ 5% 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Effective Revenue 29 29 29 30 30 30 32 32 32 34 34 34 36 
Total Revenue 172 180 189 200 210 221 234 246 259 275 289 305 323 
Expenses (1) 
Operating 48 51 54 57 61 64 68 72 77 81 86 91 96 
Management Fee (Res.) 7 8 8 8 9 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 15 
Total Expenses 55 59 62 65 70 74 78 83 88 93 99 105 111 
Revenue Before Debt Service 117 121 127 135 140 147 156 163 171 182 190 200 212 
Debt Service (2) 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Net Revenue 68 72 78 86 91 98 107 114 122 133 141 151 163 
Distribution of Net Revenue (3) 
To private Investors: 
10% return on $400,290; 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
50% of residual after payment 6 10 15 21 to non-profit corporation 
To Non-Profit Corporation: 
10% return on $800,580 28 32 38 46 51 58 67 74 81 81 81 81 81 
(if available); 
50% of residual . 6 10 l 15 
4' 
21) 
point of recovery of 
government loan of $800,580 
Table 6 
East of Main Site - Operating Budget ($GOO's) 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Revenue (l) Base Year 
Gross Revenue 311 329 349 370 392 416 441 467 495 525 557 590 625 662 702 744 
Less Vacancy @5% 16 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 28 29 31 33 35 37 
Effective Revenue 295 313 332 352 372 395 419 444 471 499 529 560 594 629 667 707 
Expenses (l) 
Operating 96 102 108 115 121 129 136 145 153 162 172 187 198 210 223 236 
Management Fee 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 28 30 32 34 36 
Total Expenses 111 118 125 133 140 149 157 167 177 187 198 215 228 242 257 272 
Revenue Before Debt Service 184 195 207 219 232 246 262 277 294 312 331 345 366 387 410 485 
Debt Service (2) 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Net Revenue 87 98 110 122 135 149 165 180 197 215 234 248 269 290 313 330 
Distribution of Net Revenue (3) 
To Private Investors: 
10% return on $786,622; 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
50% of residual after payment 6 17 27 38 51 to non-profit corporation. 
To Non-Profit Corporation: 
10% return on $1 ,573,244 0 19 31 43 56 70 86 101 118 136 155 157 157 157 157 157 
(if available); 
50% of residual. 6 16 27 '39 \II 
51, 
point of recovery 
of government loan 
of $1 ,573,244 
